after stating the case: Plaintiffs tendered numerous issues, but as the one submitted by the court embraced every issuable fact in the case, and enabled the plaintiff to present fully its side of the case to the jury, it was proper to reject plaintiff’s tender and refuse to" multiply the issues, which course, if it had been adopted, would have tended to great prolixity, and this should always be avoided. Black v. Black, 110 N. C., 398; Hatcher v. Dabbs, 133 N. C., 239; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 146 N. C., 484.
We were told on the argument that the judge construed the contract to mean that the lumber was not sold to the plaintiff, but was intended to be a mere security for the advancements made by it to the defendant company. This construction is not permissible, as the language of the parties plainly expresses the contrary. It may be the court took the view that while it *398was a contract for a sale of tbe lumber by tbe defendant, tbe damages now claimed for its breach are speculative. Tbe plaintiff only seeks to recover tbe difference between tbe contract price and tbe market value of tbe lumber at tbe time and place fixed for its delivery, and to this it is clearly entitled. It is tbe usual rule by wbicli to measure damages in sucb cases, and sucb a loss by tbe plaintiff was surely in tbe contemplation of tbe parties at tbe time tbey made tbe contract, as tbe one which would naturally and probably result from a breach by tbe defendant. We have held at this term that tbe correct rule for tbe assessment of damages, when there has been a breach in failing to deliver tbe goods bargained for, is tbe difference between tbe agreed price and tbe market value at tbe time and place of delivery. Berbarry v. Tombacher, post, citing many authorities. We were cited by defendant’s counsel to Machine Co. v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C., 284, and Wilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N. C., 20, but those cases in no degree conflict with tbe general rule now applied to this case. Tbe first of them decides, as tbe syllabus shows:
“1. Where one violates bis contract, be is liable for sucb damages, including gains prevented as well as losses sustained, as may fairly be supposed, to have entered into tbe contemplation of tbe parties when they made tbe contract, that is, sucb as might naturally be expected to follow its violation, and tbey must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to tbe cause from which tbey proceed.
“2. Tbe law seeks to give full compensation in damages for a breach of contract, and in pursuit of this end it allows profits to be considered when tbe contract itself,- or any rule of law, or an,y other element in tbe case, furnishes a standard by which their amount may be determined with sufficient certainty.
“3. In an.action for damages for a breach of contract, in tbe absence of-some standard, fixed by tbe parties when tbey made their contract, tbe law will not permit mere profits, depending upon tbe chances, of business and other contingent circumstances, and -which are perhaps merely fanciful, to be considered by tbe jury as part of tbe compensation.”
In tbe second case, we said: “In an action for damages, tbe plaintiff must prove, as part of bis case, both tbe amount and *399tbe cause of bis loss. Absolute certainty, however, is not required; but botb tbe cause and tbe amount of tbe loss must be shown with reasonable certainty. Substantial damages may be recovered, though plaintiff can only give bis loss approximately. A difficulty arises, however, where compensation is claimed for prospective losses in tbe nature of gains prevented; but absolute certainty is not required. Compensation for prospective losses may be recovered when they are such as in tbe ordinary course of things are reasonably certain to ensue. Reasonable means reasonable probability. Where the losses claimed are' contingent, speculative, or merely possible, they cannot be allowed. . . .' Profits which would certainly have been realized but for the defendant’s fault are recoverable; those which are speculative anld contingent, are not. The broad general rule in such cases is that the party injured is entitled to recover all his damages, including gains prevented as well as losses sustained; and this rule is subject to but two conditions: The damages must be such .as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract, that is, mustt be such as might naturally be expected to follow its violation; and they must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed. It is not necessary that such damages shall be shown with mathematical accuracy.” See Hale on Damages, pp. 10, 71; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y., 489; Masterton v. Mayor, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 61. This statement of the rule is in substantial accord with Machine Co. v. Tobacco Co., supra, and the two cases collect the principal authorities upon the subject. If the damages are certain, and such as must have been reasonably contemplated by the parties, they are recoverable for the breach of the contract of sale, but if purely speculative or fanciful and subject to possible exigencies not likely to be foreseen, they are considered too remote and subtle in their influence to be reached or established by legal proof or judicial investigation, and are,, therefore, rejected as an element of compensation. Masterton v. Mayor, supra. But the difference between the price and the market value at the time and place of the deliv*400ery fixed by tbe contract is not speculative, but furnishes a certain standard by which to estimate the loss in ease of a breach,» and is the one which the very nature of the contract suggests was contemplated by the parties. “Damages are given as a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction to the plaintiff for an injury actually received by him from the defendant, and should be precisely conmiensurate with the injury, neither more nor less. 2 Greenleaf Ev., sec. 253. The amount should, be what he would have received if the defendant had complied with the contract. Alden v. Keighly, 15 M. and W., 117.” Lumber Co. v. Iron Works, 130 N. C., 584.
The court erred in not applying the proper rule to the case, whereby it excluded from the recovery substantial damages, to which the plaintiff was entitled, if the jury had found the facts according to his testimony.
New trial.