If the plaintiff had been well and strong, or if there was no evidence that the defendant had notice of her feeble condition, we would hold that there could be no recovery, except of nominal damages for putting her off on the wrong side of the train, because under such circumstances the evidence in this case would fail to show a breach of duty.
There is, however, evidence that she was feeble; that the defendant knew of this fact, and that she suffered by reason of exposure on the west side of the train, which might have been averted.
Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care; but what is ordinary care is dependent upon the circumstances, and is usually a question of fact for the decision of a jury.
The carrier may make'■reasonable regulations as to the running of its trains, and may determine the part of the train to be nearest the station at stops, having a due regard for the convenience of the traveling public, and providing reasonably safe walkways from the place of egress to the station, and it would seriously interfere with the operation of trains, the maintenance of schedules, and the right of passengers to be transported without unnecessary delay, to impose the duty of stopping each car so that all passengers could alight nearest to the station.
Nor is the carrier required to furnish a nurse or attendant for a sick passenger; but as was said by Justice Brown in Clark *466 v. Traction Co., 138 N. C., 82: “The authorities are all to the effect that a degree of attention beyond that due to ordinary passengers should be bestowed on those affected with a disability by which the hazards of travel are increased. The sick, the lame, children, and aged persons are -entitled to more care and attention from those in charge of a car than those in full possession of their strength and faculties.” Croom v. R. R., 52 Minn., 296; Sheridan v. R. R., 36 N. Y., 39; R. R. v. Powell, 40 Ind., 37.
Applying this principle, and considering all the circumstances, we are of opinion there was some evidence of negligence in putting the plaintiff off on the west side of the track, and that this was the cause of her subsequent sickness.
As the question must be considered by another jury, because of error hereafter pointed out, we forbear to discuss it further, except to say that the jury should be instructed, under the evidence as now presented, that they cannot allow any damages on account of sickness, unless they find that the exposure from the time she left the train on the west side until she reached the waiting-room caused it.
The charge on the issue of damages is erroneous.
The damages are awarded as one sum, -and his Honor did not confine the recovery for wrongfully putting her off on the east side to nominal damages. On the contrary, he told the jury they might award compensatory damages for fright caused on the east side of the train, disconnected from any physical injury, and this is material, because» it may be the jury were not satisfied that the exposure after the plaintiff left the train on the west side caused her to be sick, and that the damages awarded were for fright alone.
The statement in Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C., 403, that, “All the courts agree that mere fright, unaccompanied by physical injury, cannot be considered .as an element of damage,” is fully sustained by the authorities.
There must, therefore, be a new trial for the error pointed out.
*467Justice Wauker and Justice BrowN, while consenting to a new trial, in deference to the views of tbe majority of the Court, are of opinion that there is no evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant, and that the motion to nonsuit should have been sustained.