The decisions of this State are in full recognition of tbe principle that when the entire contract between parties has been put in writing and expressed in terms plain of meaning, it may not be contradicted or altered by parol testimony (Fertilizer Co. v. McLawhorn, 158 N. C., 274; Jeffords v. Waterworks, 157 N. C., 10; Bank v. Moore, 138 N. C., 529), and they are also in affirmance of the position that when the contract is partly in writing, the oral stipulations can be made available when they do not contradict the part that is written, for, as said by the Ghief Justice in Walker v. Venters, 148 N. C., at page 389, “The written word abides.” The doctrine as it obtains here is very well stated in the first headnote to Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C., 61, as follows: “The rule that when parties reduce their agreement to writing, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, add to, or explain it, applies only when the entire contract has been reduced to writing; and where a part has been written and the other part left in parol, it is competent to establish the latter by oral evidence, provided it does not conflict with what has been written.” In that well-considered opinion and in a case in the next volume, Typewriter Co. v. Hardwood Co., 143 N. C., 97, it was held, in effect, that when a note is given payable in money, or so many dollars, without further written specification, parol evidence may be received tending to establish, as part of the contract, a contemporaneous agreement that a different method of payment should be accepted. In Brown on Parol Evidence, sec. 117, it is stated as a recognized proposition that “Parol evidence is admissible te show an agreed mode of payment and discharge other than that specified in the bond.” The words appearing on the face of the order, “Terms: Net cash thirty days after installation,” in no wise affect the position, for these words, by correct interpretation, have reference only to the time and amount of payment and the passing of the title, and do not and were not intended to specify or control the method of such payment. Mead v. McLoughlin, 42 Mo., 198; Foley and Woodside v. Mason, 6 Maryland, 37; Austin v. Welch, 72 S. W., 881. In Woodson v. Beck, 151 N. C., 144, the application of the principle, as heretofore stated, was denied because the parol *435evidence offered tended to establish throughout a radical change in the contract, of which the note sued on was an admitted part, and in Walker v. Venters, supra, the same ruling was made because a specific method of payment was expressly stipulated for in the writing, to wit, “so many bales of cotton, weighing 500 pounds each,” and cotton being high at the time, it was held that the offer to show a parol agreement that payment could be made in money of a less amount was of the substance and in direct contradiction of the written stipulation.
In the case before us, the written contract stated the price of trap to be net $250. The testimony offered by defendant, recognizing as it did the full measure of the obligation as contained in the paper-writing, tended, as it now stands and in one aspect of it, to show as part of the contract that there was an agreement that the trap presently sold should be paid for by taking back the trap previously bought and paying $50 additional. It tended only to show a different method of payment, and, under the authorities cited, we are of opinion that the same should have been received and considered on the issue as to the amount due. Again, while the testimony may not establish that plaintiff agreed to accept a different method of payment, this being indicated by a proposed question and answer to a witness of defendant, which were excluded, the facts set up by way of counterclaim, and the evidence offered in support of same, amounted to an averment that there had been a breach of guarantee in the sale of the former trap, causing damage to defendant, and in case the former position should be determined against defendant, he is entitled to have this aspect of his ease presented under proper issues, and the amount of damage, if any, ascertained and declared by way of counterclaim, and, under our decisions, this right is not affected because no such relief is asked. As said in Cheese Co. v. Pipkin, 155 N. C., 401, “In numerous and repeated decisions of this Court, we have held that neither a particular form of statement nor a special prayer for relief should be allowed as determinative or controlling, but that rights are declared and justice administered on the facts which are alleged and properly established,” citing Williams v. R. R., 144 N. C., 498-505; Bowers *436 v. R. R., 101 N. C., 721, and other decisions; and Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C., 467, is a recent and well-considered case in support of tbe position. There is error in the ruling by which the defendant’s evidence was excluded, and this will be’certified, that the cause may be tried before another jury.