after stating the case: The testimony in this case is very voluminous, covering more than one hundred pages of the record. We have examined it carefully and have concluded that the judge might well have charged the jury that if, therefrom, they found the facts to be as stated by the witnesses, their verdict should be for the defendant, provided he paid full value for the land. But surely the plaintiff cannot complain that the evidence was submitted to the jury under the instructions set out in the case. The jury have found that there was no coercion or undue influence hy the defendant, B. M. Moore; that the amount paid by him for the land in the transaction of 6 September, 1905, was the full and reasonable value thereof; that the reconveyance was macle to the defendant, not hy the use of any influence by him upon the plaintiff, but at the latter’s request, and that the plaintiff had paid nothing on the purchase money. The court placed the burden upon the defendant to satisfy the jury that he took no advantage of his position as mortgagee to repurchase the land, and that the transaction in which he acquired it was bona fide and free from coercion, and that he paid full and fair value for the land.
The law governing this case has been firmly and finally settled by McLeod v. Bullard, 84 N. C., 516, in which the rule, as formerly adopted in Whitehead v. Hellen, 76 N. C., 99, is thus stated: “Courts of equity look with jealousy upon all dealings between trustees and cestuis que trustent; and if the mortgagor had hy deed released his equity of redemption to his mortgagee, we should have required the purchaser to take the burden of *386proof and satisfy us that tbe man whom be had in his power, manacled and fettered, had without undue influence and for a fair consideration released his right to redeem.” Lea v. Pearce, 68 N. C., 16; Bigelow on Fraud (Ed. of 1890), pp. 261 and 295. In Smith v. Moore, 142 N. C., at p. 296, speaking of this principle of equity, the Court said: “When a party, complaining of a particular transaction, such as a gift, sale, or contract, has-shown to the court the existence of a fiduciary or a confidential .relation between himself and the defendant, and that the defendant occupied the position of trust or confidence therein, the law raises a suspicion, or, it is often said, a presumption of fraud — a suspicion or presumption, arising as matter of law, that the transaction brought to the notice of the court was effected by fraud, or, what comes to much the same thing, undue influence, by reason of his occupying a position affording him peculiar opportunities for taking advantage of the complaining party. Having special facilities for committing fraud upon the party whose interests have been intrusted to him, the law, looking to the frailty of human nature, requires the party in the superior situation to show that his action has been honest and honorable. 1 Bigelow on Fraud, p. 261 et seq. This presumption is raised, where there have been dealings between the parties, because of the advantage which the situation of the parties respectively gives to one over the other. The doctrine rests on the idea, not that there actually was, but that there may have been fraud, and an artificial effect is given' to the fiduciary relation beyond its natural tendency to produce belief of the fact that fraud really existed. Lee v. Pearce, supra.” Numerous cases in this Court, decided since McLeod v. Bullard, have followed that case and applied the rule. Brown v. Mitchell, 102 N. C., 347. As the jury have found that the transaction was fair and honest and actually free from the exercise of any undue influence, and especially as it appears that defendant did not-use his power and position as mortgagee to drive an unfair bargain with the plaintiff, but acted solely upon the latter’s initiative and at his express request, the presumption of fraud disappears and the case of the plaintiff is left without any foundation.
*387The first issue tendered by plaintiff was embraced by the issue which the court submitted. It was but one of the elements involved in that issue, and was not broad and comprehensive enough, when standing by itself, to be determinative. He had the full benefit of it under the issue submitted, which is sufficient. Belching v. Archer, 131 N. C., 287; Ratliff v. Ratliff, ibid., 425; Goal Co. v. Ice Co., 134 N. C., 577; Grocery Co. v. R. R., 136 N. C., 396; Deaver v. Deaver, 137 N. C., 240; Hatcher v. Dabbs, 133 N. C., 239. As to the second issue he tendered, the record shows conclusively that the amount due to Moore was admitted, and the issue was, therefore, immaterial.
The court could not have given the instructions requested by the plaintiff without passing upon the facts. The whole inquiry was directed to the validity of the transaction of 6 September, 1905, when the 687-acre tract was reconveyed and plaintiff received a deed for the smaller tract at his request, and the rental value of the mill and farm since that time, referred to in the third issue tendered by plaintiff and in his prayers for instruction, was an immaterial fact, for the jury having found that the transaction was valid, the defendant, B. M. Moore, was entitled to the rents, it being his own land.
We do not perceive any error in the other rulings to which exceptions were taken.
No error.