after stating the case: In Davis v. Frazier, 150 N. C., 451, the Court said: “It is. an undoubted principle that a subsequent clause irreconcilable with a former clause and repugnant to the general purpose and intent of the contract will be set aside. This was expressly held in Jones v. Casualty Co., 140 N. C., 262, and there are many decisions with us to like effect; but, as indicated in the case referred to and the authorities cited in its support, this-principle is in subordination to another position, that the intent of the parties as embodied in the entire instrument is the end to be attained, and that each and every part of the contract must be given effect, if this can be done by any fair or reasonable interpretation; and it is only after subjecting the instrument to this controlling principle of construction that a subsequent clause may be rejected as repugnant and irreconcilable. Jones v. Casualty Co., supra; Lawson on Contracts, secs. 388, 389; Bishop on Contracts, secs. 386, 387.”
This decision was cited and approved in Refining Co. v. Construction Co., 157 N. C., 280, and by Allen, J., in Hendricks v. Furniture Co., 156 N. C., 569, and the general principle has been directly applied to deeds conveying realty in several recent and well-considered decisions of the Court. Acker v. Pridgen, 158 N. C., 337; In re Dixon, 156 N. C., 26; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394; Featherston v. Merrimon, 148 N. C., 199.
In our opinion, these authorities are decisive and are against the defendants’ jDOsition as to the interpretation of the present deed.
From a perusal of the entire instrument, and giving to every clause its reasonable effect, we think it clear that-the grantor had in mind the two conditions or events, one in case he survived his wife and the other if she survived him. In the latter case the land is in effect conveyed to her during her life or widow-*45bood and then to the children of the marriage in fee, and in the former, “The property shall revert to me.” There is nothing in the instrument to indicate that the grantor intended only a life estate should revert, as in Dixon’s case, supra, but by correct and reasonable interpretation, in case he survived his wife, the property and all interest in it should revert. Revisal 1905, sec. 946. There is therefore no irreconcilable conflict in the different clauses of the deed, and on the facts and evidence and under the authorities cited the grantor should be declared the owner of the property in fee. In Fortune v. Hunt, 152 N. C., 715, and in Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N. C., 40, it was held that the former and the latter clauses of the deeds were in irreconcilable conflict, and the Court applied the familiar principle that in such case and as to deeds the former should prevail.
For the error indicated, the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.