— Decree that the legacy to David C. Ward is a satisfaction of the debt due him.
Ward v. Coffield, 16 N.C. 108, 1 Dev. Eq. 108 (1827)
Dec. 1827
·
Supreme Court of North Carolina
16 N.C. 108, 1 Dev. Eq. 108
Charlotte Ward, executrix of John D. Ward, v. John Coffield.
From Edgecomb.
A legacy which is equal to or larger in value than a debt due by the testator to the legatee, is prima fade a satisfaction of the debt.
Where A devised all his North-Carolina property to liis son B, and all his Tennessee property to his son D, a. resident of Tennessee, and charged all his debts due in North-Oarolina upon the devise to B, a debt duo to D less than the legacy to him, was held to be satisfied, by it.
This bill was filed to obtain the advice of the Court, and in order to expedite the cause, a case agreed was made up, of which the following are the material facts:
The Plaintiff’s testator formerly resided in the State of Tennessee, where he married and had issue David C. Ward. On the deatii of his wife, he removed to this State, leaving his son David, and a considerable property in the State of Tennessee, where David has ever resided. In this State he again married, and had issue Joseph IS. Ward, and died considerably indebted here, and to his son David two hundred and fifty dollars, which was the only debt lie owed out of this State. By his will be devised all his North-Carolina property to his son Joseph, and all that in Tennessee to David, am! autho-rised bis executors to sell such of his property in this State as they might deem necessary and sufficient for the payment of his “just debts in this State.”
The question made by the case was, whether the debt due David was a proper charge upon the North-Garo-lina estate, or not.
Gaston, for the Plaintiff,
submitted the case without argument, no Counsel appearing for the Defendant.
Taylor, Chief-Justice
— John D. Ward was indebted to his son David in the principal sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, and devised to him all his property iu *109Tennessee, which consisting of real and personal estate together, is of much greater value than the debt so owing from the testator to his son. In order to ascertain whether the legacy shall be construed a satisfaction of the debt, the general rule to govern us is, that a legacy which is greater, or as great as the debt, shall be taken as a satisfaction ; and this rule is firmly established, notwithstanding the late cases which decide, that where there are circumstances, or presumptions, that the testator did not intend it as a satisfaction, the Court will lean against the rule. Where these circumstances do not exist, the rule will clearly operate, although it lias never been a favorite with the Courts; it being thought strange that if the estate is sufficient for both debt and bounty, the testator should not intend both. There is no circumstance in this case, to repel the application of the rule; hut there is on the contrary a clause in the will, from which an inference arises, that the testator was aware of the rule, and meant that it should operate. He makes a provision for the payment of his debts in this State, and none for the only debt he owed out of the State, viz: that to his son, from the belief, probably, that he was paying that debt by the legacy. If therefore, the rule were not applied to this case, it must be disregarded in every other ; but this a Court has no authority to do— independently of the evils which would arise from a want of certainty in the law. I am consequently of opinion, that the debt of the testator to his son David, is not a charge, either in whole or in part, upon the property in this State.