Ricks v. Woodard, 159 N.C. 647 (1912)

Sept. 18, 1912 · Supreme Court of North Carolina
159 N.C. 647

W. S. RICKS et al. v. W. T. WOODARD and Wife.

(Filed 18 September, 1912.)

1. Deeds and Conveyances — Boundaries—Evidence—General Reputation — Remoteness.

Evidence of tbe correct location of a divisional line between tbe lands of contesting parties, by general reputation, is sufficient, which tends to show that forty or more years ago it was a cross-fence on certain sides of a field of a named owner of lands; or that it was a line just beyond the stables of the owner of a certain side of the field, it being sufficiently remote and attaching to physical objects “tending to give the land in question a fixed and definite location.” Lamb v. Gopelaml, 158 N. 0., 130. cited and applied.

2. Same — Less Remote — Corroboration.

When there is competent evidence- by general reputation of the divisional line between the lands of contesting i>arties, sufficiently remote, evidence of this reputation for a period not sufficient (in this case, twenty years), is competent for the purposes of corroboration.

*6483. Deeds and Conveyances — Boundaries—General Reputation — Evidence— Competent in Part — Objections and Exceptions — Appeal and Error.

A general objection to tlie testimony of a witness as to tbe true location of tbe divisional line between. contesting parties, and wbicb is not competent as not being of a time sufficiently remote, is not bold for error on appeal, ■ when it appears tliat tbe objection was to a general statement of the witness and that said statement contained testimony that was both relevant and competent.

Appeal by defendant from Cline, J., at Spring Term, 1912, of NORTHAMPTON.

Civil action to determine boundary line between two- tracts of land. There was verdict for plaintiff. Judgment on verdict, and defendant excepted and appealed.

Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion of tbe Court by Mr. Justice Holce.

Mason, Worrell & Long and D. C. Barnes for plaintiff.

Winborne & Winborne for defendant.

Hoke, J.

Tbe suit involved tbe correct location of a divisional line between two adjoining tracts of land in said county, tbe Barnes tract and tbe Tyner tract. Under a charge, to wbicb no exceptions were taken, the jury established tbe line as contended for by tbe plaintiff, and we find no exceptions on tbe record wbicb may be allowed for reversible error. In tbe progress of tbe trial, evidence was admitted from several witnesses tending to establish a general reputation that tbe true dividing-line was located as claimed by plaintiff. Tbe reception of this evidence was urged for error, tbe objection being, chiefly, that it was too vague and indefinite; but tbe record, in our opinion, will not sustain tbe position.

Speaking to this character of evidence, in Hemphill v. Hemphill, 138 N. C., 506, tbe Court said: “Such evidence lias been uniformly received in this State, and tbe restrictions put upon it by our decisions seem to be that tbe reputation, whether by parol or otherwise, should have its origin at a time comparatively remote, and always ante litem motam. Second, that it should attach itself to some monument of boundary or natural *649object, or be fortified and supported by evidence of occupation and acquiescence tending to give tbe land in question some fixed or definite location.” Citing Tate v. Southard, 8 N. C., 45; Mendenhall v. Cassells, 20 N. C., 49; Dobson v. Finley, 53 N. C., 496; Shaffer v. Gaynor, 117 N. C., 15; Westfeldt v. Adams, 131 N. C., 379-384. A statement quoted witb approval in Lamb v. Copeland, 158 N. C., 136.

In tbe present ease, tbe great bulk of tbis testimony, and tbe only portion to wbicb exception was properly taken, was to tbe effect that so long as forty and fifty years ago there was a general reputation that tbe dividing line between these two tracts of land was as claimed by plaintiff. One witness; E. S. Yick, saying in tbis connection: “There was a general reputation when I first knew these matters of tbe dividing line between tbe Tyner and Barnes land. I knew that reputation. It was a cross-fence on tbe south and east side of tbe Mary Cook field and the northwest side of a field on tbe Tyner land, known as tbe Yick field.” Another, Lee Davis: “There was a general reputation of location of tbe dividing line between tbe Barnes and Tyner lands; that by that reputation tbe line tree was just behind tbe stable on tbe Jack field and went to tbe upper corner of tbe Jack field fence to a large pine, which was a line tree; tbis ran along tbe southeast side of tbe Jack field.” And another, Britt Morgan: “That be is seventy-six years old; that there was a general reputation forty-five years ago as to tbe dividing line between tbe Barnes and Tyner land; was tbe fence along tbe J ack field, and there used to be a footpath on a part of this line; the fore and aft tree stood right behind tbe stable on the J ack field; it was a spruce pine tree, and tbe line went on down, putting tbe Jack field on tbe west and tbe Tyner land on the east side; went to three corn shuckings in tbe Jack field for Henry Barnes forty years or more ago,” etc. Tbis testimony fully meets tbe requirements of tbe principle. It was sufficiently remote and did attach itself to physical objects “tending to give tbe land in question a fixed and definite location.” True, one witness spoke of tbis reputation as existing to his knowledge twenty years ago,” and tbis, under- our decisions, could not properly be considered as coming within tbe rule *650heretofore stated. See Lamb v. Copeland, supra. But this, in our opinion, cannot be held for reversible error: (1) Because (•he objection was made to a more general statement of the witness, in which was included much testimony that was undoubtedly competent. S. v. Ledford, 133 N. C., 714. (2) It was permissible, in support and corroboration of the testimony tending to establish the existence of an earlier reputation, which, as we have seen, had been properly received in evidence and was before the jury for consideration on the issue.

There is no error, and the judgment in plaintiff’s favor is affirmed.

No error.