The defendant was charged in tbe Municipal Court of Greensboro witb tbe common-law offense of keeping a disorderly bouse, and was convicted. Sbe appealed, and was again convicted in tbe Superior Court, but tbe judgment was arrested upon tbe ground tbat tbe crime was not committed witbin tbe corporate limits of Greensboro, although it was. committed witbin one mile of tbe same. Appeal by tbe State.
Tbe contention is tbat tbe Legislature could not confer jurisdiction upon tbe Municipal Court of Greensboro to bear and determine criminal cases where tbe offenses are committed, not in tbe city, but witbin one mile thereof, and that she should have been indicted originally in tbe Superior Court.
The acts establishing tbe court expressly give tbe jurisdiction where tbe crime is committed in tbe city or witbin one mile of its corporate limits. Public Laws 1909, chap. 651, as amended by Private Laws 1911, chap. 430. Counsel for tbe defendant argued tbat this jurisdiction was not authorized by tbe Constitution, as it conflicted witb tbe jurisdiction of justices of tbe peace under tbat instrument; but we think tbe question has been decided against this contention in several eases. .It is only necessary to reproduce what was said in S. v. Collins, 151 N. C., 648, where reference is thus made to tbe constitutional provision (Article IV, see. 12) for tbe establishment of courts inferior to tbe Superior Court: “These provisions, so plainly worded and so comprehensive in their scope, would seem to admit of no doubt as to tbe rightful exercise by tbe Legislature of its constitutional power in enacting tbe law by virtue of which tbe Recorder’s Court of Nash County was created and afterwards organized, and to be a full answer to. tbe contention of tbe State in tbe court below. But tbe question *469lias been heretofore fully considered by this Court, and we. reached the conclusion that the Legislature had the power, under the Constitution, to establish a recorder’s court, not only for cities and towns (S. v. Lytle, 138 N. C., 738; S. v. Baskerville, 141 N. C., 811; S. v. Jones, 145 N. C., 460), but also for counties (S. v. Shine, 149 N. C., 480). In the case last cited the Legislature created the recorder’s court of Monroe, in the county of Union, and further provided in the act by which the court was established, as follows: ‘Said court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine all other criminal offenses committed within the county of Union below the grade of a felony, as now defined by law, and all other such offenses committed within the county of Union are hereby declared to be petty misdemeanors.’ This language is at least substantially identical with that to be found in Laws 1909, chap. 633, by which a recorder’s court for Nash County was created. If the former act was valid, and we so held, the latter must necessarily be.” It will be observed that in S. v. Gollins it appeared that the court was created for the entire county, including the town of Nashville, the capital of .the county, and other towns therein. In S. v. Shine the court was created for the city of Monroe, but its jurisdiction was extended beyond the city and to the county limits. The offense for which the defendant was convicted, in that case, was committed beyond the city limits. S. v. Baskerville, supra. These authorities seem to be decisive of the question now raised by the appellant.
It is not necessary to decide whether the provision as to the exclusiveness of the court’s jurisdiction is valid, as, if it can only be concurrent with -the court of a justice of the peace in certain cases, it has assumed and exercised, in this case, its rightful jurisdiction, and the question as to the extent of the jurisdiction is not presented, nor was it presented in S. v. Collins.
The only question here is, and so it was in that case as to the recorder’s court, whether the statutory court or the Superior Court had the jurisdiction. S. v. Doster, 157 N. C., 634, cited by defendant’s counsel, does not sustain the position that, *470because this is called a municipal court, and has jurisdiction of offenses committed in the city, it can have no jurisdiction beyond the city limits, under Article IX, sec. 14, of the Constitution, which provides for special courts for the trial of misdemeanors in cities and towns; but the intimation is clear that such jurisdiction may be given, though in some cases it may be concurrent. The offense, in that,case, was within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, and committed outside of the city of Monroe. The defendant had been tried before a justice and convicted. On appeal he moved to quash, and the question was whether the Recorder’s Court of Monroe had exclusive - jurisdiction. The Court held that it did not, but it did not decide that the jurisdiction was not concurrent, or that the Legislature could not confer jurisdiction outside the city upon the recorder’s court. In this case, the offense is not within, the final jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. "We do not see why the Legislature, under Article IY, sec. 12, of the Constitution, is not invested with ample power to establish this court and assign to it the jurisdiction conferred by the statute. The court is given jurisdiction over offenses committed within the city of Greensboro, but the power of the Legislature was not thereby exhausted. It follows, therefore, that there was error in the judgment of the court.
Error.