It is apparent from tbe findings of Judge Cline that the respondents undertook, by themselves and without the acquiescence of the plaintiff or the sanction of the court, to survey and locate the lines of Tract No. 1, and upon their own location of the boundaries to cut timber within what his Honor designates in his findings as “disputed territory.” There was a contest between the- parties as to the location of the land, and the injunction was issued in order to preserve the status quo until the dispute could be settled. It cannot well be questioned that respondents knew that they were cutting timber on the land claimed by the plaintiff — that is, on the land in controversy. The plaintiff, in his complaint, alleged that he owned Lots 1 and 2 of the land known as New Lebanon, and that defendants had entered thereon and cut therefrom a large quantity of timber, and were still engaged in doing so. The land claimed by the plaintiff, if we stop at the complaint, is that described as •the land upon which the defendant and its corespondent and superintendent, at that time, were cutting timber. They were restrained by the order of Judge Whedbee from cutting any more on that land; and, by the modified order of Judge Ward, from cutting any timber from that land, or removing any except that already cut.
In the affidavits of J. T. Ansell and J. J. Watson, it was alleged that they were still cutting timber at that place, and, upon those affidavits, Judge Ward issued his second order, requiring them to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt for disobeying the order in the manner stated in said affidavits. Even after this warning, they continued to cut at the same place. In addition to this, Judge Cline has found as facts that they proceeded arbitrarily to locate the line and then cut timber on Tract No. 1, as claimed by the plaintiff, and in disregard of the order forbidding them to do so. If such a proceeding should be permitted, the orders of the court could easily be set at naught and the rights of parties litigant greatly prejudiced.
*273Tbis ease is not unlike Davis v. Fiber Co., 150 N. C., 84, in wbicb, referring to a similar state of facts, Justice Hoke said: “The court finds, and there was ample evidence to sustain the finding, as follows: ‘I find that since the restraining order made as aforesaid was duly served upon the said Champion Fiber Company, it and its superintendent of the woods department, Harry Rotha, under the advice of counsel, have undertaken to arbitrarily locate the Cathcart line to suit their own purposes, and have willfully and intentionally continued to cut and carry away timber trees situate and being- on the land claimed by plaintiffs and embraced in the restraining order, just as they were doing before the issuing of said order.’ And on this finding we are of opinion that the defendants were properly adjudged guilty of contempt. It is contended that the preliminary restraining order is not sufficiently definite in its terms to authorize the judgment, but we cannot take that view of the order when considered in connection with the evidence in the case and the findings of the judge thereon. The description of the land was fully set forth in the complaint by metes and bounds. The allegations in the complaint that the 'defendants had wrongfully entered and trespassed upon said lands,’ by fair and reasonable intendment could only refer to the location as claimed by plaintiffs.”
"We have high authority for saying that a party enjoined must not do the prohibited thing, nor permit it to be done by his connivance, nor effect it by trick or evasion. He must do nothing, directly or indirectly, that will render the order ineffectual, either wholly or partially so. The order of the court must be obeyed implicitly, according to its spirit and in good faith. Rapalje on Contempt, sec. 40. The motive for violating the order is not considered in passing upon the question of contempt, and the respondent cannot purge himself by a disavowal of any wrong intent. It is the fact of his obedience that alone will be considered. Section 42. Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. C., 116. In deciding whether there has been an actual breach of an injunction, it' is important to consider the objects for which relief was granted, as well as the circumstances attending it, and it is to be observed that the violation of the spirit of an order *274or writ, even though, its strict letter may not have been disregarded, is a breach of the mandate of the court. 2 High on Injunctions (4 Ed.), sec. 1446; Campbell v. Tarbell, 55 Vermont, 455; Loder v. Arnold, 15 Jur., 117. The respondents may have honestly believed that the land, upon which they cut the timber, belonged to the defendant; but that is not the question. They had been forbidden to cut on land in dispute until, the controversy was settled, and this order they violated. Having found this fact, the motive, whether good or bad, for doing the forbidden thing became immaterial. The court might well have found from the affidavits that the respondents had cut timber on Lot No. 1, as described in' the complaint, but they cannot complain that the finding was not more specific or more in accordance with the probative force and full significance of the evidence, as the finding, if thus defective, is in that respect favorable to them. Nor will the advice of counsel avail the respondents in justification of their conduct. 'It may be considered by the judge in imposing punishment for the disobedience of the order, but it is no defense to the rule. Rapalje, sec. 49. 'When a party acts upon the advice of his attorney in such a case, he does so at his peril. It was suggested by plaintiff’s counsel that the respondents did not make a full disclosure to their attorney; but however this may be, they cannot profit by the advice if they actually violated the order.
No error.