Tbis case was before tbe Court on a former appeal from a ruling of tbe Superior Court judge that plaintiff was barred of recovery by reason of an equitable estoppel arising *205on the facts then presented. The Court held there was error (see 154 N. C., 359), and this opinion having been certified down, there was recovery by plaintiff, and the case is now here on appeal of defendants.
On the present trial it was agreed that both parties claimed under John ~W. Heptinstall, deceased, and plaintiff's legal title was made to rest on a devise in his last will and testament to his wife Cornelia, and by devise of Cornelia to plaintiff. The descriptive words of the devise to- Cornelia are as follows: “I give my wife, Cornelia, the house where we now live, with all the outhouses and premises, embracing the peach and apple orchard,” etc. Under our authorities this description is sufficiently definite to pass title to the property ■ and permit the reception of parol evidence to fit the description to the land intended. Ward v. Gay, 137 N. C., 397; Blow v. Vaughan, 105 N. C., 198. And the jury having found that the locus in quo is included within the terms of the devise to plaintiff, the question is again presented as to the existence of an equitable estop-pel. On that position we find nothing in the present record which materially differs from the case as formally presented, and for the reasons so clearly stated in the opinion by Associate Justice Walher, the judgment in favor of plaintiff must be sustained.
On the present trial, as heretofore, it was made to appear that plaintiff, the devisee under the will of John W. Heptinstall and subsequently of Cornelia, his wife, on 24 March, 1911, sold and conveyed to a Mrs. Miles, wife of T. J. Miles, a portion of the land, being under the impression that it was all she owned in that locality or under the devise, and in the deed described the same on one side as bordering on the “line of Y. N. Bond, defendant.” The plaintiff, who resided in Greensboro, N. C., having come to Littleton on the day.her deed bears date, for the purpose of attending a sale of her aunt’s personal property, the witness T. J. Miles, husband of the purchaser of plaintiff’s lot, determined to have the dividing line between the two lots determined upon, defendant contending that the true dividing line ran straight back from the Presbyterian Church lot, and T. J. Miles, the husband of the purchaser, contending that a slight deflection should be made, and a dividing line was *206agreed upon between T. J. Miles, tbe witness and tbe defendant. Tbe only difference in tbe evidence as shown on tbe two appeals is that it did not appear in tbe former ease that plaintiff was at any time xoresent or knew anything whatever of tbe occurrence, while there is evidence now appearing that she was present at tbe time or cognizant of what was being done; but this fact does not at all affect tbe result as applied to tbe issue. It is well understood in this State that boundary lines as contained in written deeds, dividing or other, may not be changed by parol evidence except in tbe one case where contemporaneously with tbe execution of a deed tbe physical boundaries are actually run and marked for tbe purpose of making tbe deed and are thereby given a different placing. And that as to deeds already executed and under ordinary circumstances parties are not estopped by their parol agreements fixing boundaries at a place different from that shown in tbe deeds. Buckner v. Anderson, 111 N. C., 575; Shaffer v. Hahn, 111 N. C., 1; Carraway v. Chancy, 51 N. C., 361; Davidson v. Arledge, 88 N. C., 326.
Tbe case of Hanstein v. Ferrall, 149 N. C., 240, in no way conflicts with these authorities. In Hamstein’s case long acquiescence in a certain drain as tbe dividing line between two lots and recognition of it as such by tbe adjoining proprietors was held competent and material as evidence to properly fix tbe correct dividing line between them, but not to change or vary it from tbe boundaries as contained in their deeds; and on tbe title to this adjoining lot, this lot in dispute held and claimed by defendant, it appears in tbe record, as we understand it, that defendant bad bought and paid for this lot and taken a deed from one of tbe other devisees or heirs at law of John Heptin-stall, nearly three years before this, to wit, on 10 December, 1901. As to tbe title, therefore, there is no evidence which shows or tends to show that what plaintiff did or said on this or any other occasion bad any effect whatever in inducing defendant to buy and pay for tbe lot in controversy. He simply bought tbe lot from some one who didn’t own it, and be must surrender it to plaintiff, who has tbe true title. As it was well said on tbe former -appeal: “A party claiming title to lands only by reason of an equitable estoppel of tbe other party to *207tbe action., arising from bis alleged acts and conduct respecting a line between adjoining lands, must show that tbe acts and conduct relied on have misled and caused him loss or damage.”
There is nothing to withdraw defendant’s claim from the effect and operation of the principle, and the judgment for plaintiff, therefore, must be affirmed.
No error.