This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff alleges that the company furnished him and other employees iron tamping rods to be used in tamping dynamite, and while so being used the iron tamping rods caused an explosion which seriously and permanently injured the plaintiff. He further alleges that in a few days after his return from the hospital, and while blind, and suffering in mind and body from said injuries, and mentally incompetent and incapable of transacting any business, the defendant company by fraud and false representation secured his signature to an alleged release. The defendant denied that the release was j>ro-eured by fraud and alleged that the plaintiff was competent to transact business at the time it was signed. There was evidence that the plaintiff was an inexperienced miner and did not know the danger of using the iron tamping rods; that the defendant knew that it was highly dangerous to allow its employees to use *457them, but decided to take the risk, as the company could get along- faster and do more work. The jury found in response to the thirteen issues submitted to it that the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant company; that he was not guilty of contributory negligence; that he did not assume the risk; that he was not injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant ; that the plaintiff did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute the release; that the defendant had knowledge of plaintiff’s mental incapacity; that the release was obtained by fraud and fraudulent representation, and that the amount ($372) paid the plaintiff at the time he signed the release-was not a fair and reasonable consideration, and assessed the plaintiff’s damages at $4,850.
The first exception is because the plaintiff’s wife was allowed to testify as to his mental incapacity the day he signed the release. This was competent. Stewart v. Stewart, 155 N. C., 341; Clary v. Clary, 24 N. C., 78; Whitaker v. Hamilton, 126 N. C., 466; Horah v. Knox, 87 N. C., 485; Bost v. Bost, ib., 479.
Exception 2, for refusal of the motion to nonsuit, cannot be sustained. Exception 3 is because the court did not set aside the verdict, upon the motion of the defendant, on the ground that the jury having found the plaintiff mentally incompetent when he signed the release, and he having failed to allege and prove sanity since, he could not bring this action. If there was estop-pel it was fully as much upon the defendant, who had alleged in its answer that the plaintiff had mental capacity. It is true, the jury found that the plaintiff was incompetent to sign the release 23 December, 1909, by reason of his physical and mental suffering at that time caused by his injuries, but there was no presumption that such suffering with the consequent mental and physical inability to attend to business continued down to the time of the trial, in October, 1911. Exception 4 was because the court signed judgment upon the verdict.
Exception 5 is because the court refused to instruct the jury that if “the plaintiff was negligent in any degree, and this was the proximate cause of his injury, they will answer the tenth issue ‘Yes.’ ” An instruction that if the plaintiff was “negligent in any degree” would simply confuse the jury, and has *458been condemned in another case at this term. Beach Con. Neg., secs. 21-26; Thompson Negligence, secs. 170, 171, 172, and 267; 7 A. and E. Enc., 383. The court properly refused to instruct the jury that if they believed the evidence to answer the tenth issue “Yes,” and algo in refusing to instruct the jury to make the same response .if the plaintiff knew the danger of using an iron tamping rod. These are the 6th and 7th exceptions. In lieu of them the instruction of the court on these propositions was in accordance with our precedents.
The 8th, 12th, and 13th exceptions are because the court refused to instruct the jury to answer the issue as to fraud in obtaining the release in the negative. There was evidence tending to show fraud which was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to justify the finding of the issue in the affirmative. Among them was the evidence that the plaintiff’s wife and brother were not permitted to be present in the office when the release was signed, but were left outside in the cold; that the release was executed in a few days after the plaintiff left the hospital, and while he was suffering great pain and mental anxiety occasioned by his injuries; that plaintiff was ignorant and unable to write, blind, and his hearing badly impaired; that, as he testified, he thought that he was giving a receipt for wages; that he had no friends or counsel to advise him; that the consideration paid was $372, whereas the jury found that $4,850 was reasonable and just compensation. These and other circumstances were sufficient to carry the case to the jury and justify its finding. Hayes v. R. R., 143 N. C., 128; Dorsett v. Manufacturing Co., 131 N. C., 259; Bean v. R. R., 107 N. C., 746.
The 9th exception is because the court modified an instruction asked by the defendant, that if the accident was caused by the manner in which the hole was loaded, to answer the issue as to the defendant’s negligence “No,” by adding: “If this was not a reasonably safe way of loading a hole.”
Exception 10 is because the court instructed the jury “that it was the duty of the employers to instruct their employees in the use of dangerous machinery or dynamite before assigning them to such duty.” This instruction was proper. Horne v. R. R., 153 N. C., 239. Exception 11 was on substantially the same grounds.
*459Exception 14 is because tbe court charged tbe jury that if they found that the consideration paid for the release was grossly inadequate, that this was a circumstance which they could consider in passing upon the fourth issue, as to fraud in procuring the release. This charge was in accordance with Dorsett v. Manufacturing Co., 131 N. C., 259.
Exception 15 is because the court charged the jury, “That unless you find by the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff knew of the great danger in using iron tamping rods, and voluntarily and willingly made up his mind to run the great risk incident to using the same, then you should answer the twelfth issue No.’ ” This charge is in accordance with Hickes v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 320; Lloyd v. Hanes, 126 N. C., 359.
Exception 16 is because the court charged the jury “that the use of an iron tamping rod, if it was obviously dangerous, will not prevent the plaintiff from recovering from an injury resulting therefrom unless the apparent danger was so great that its assumption would amount to a reckless indifference to probable consequences.” This is practically the language used by the Court in Coley v. R. R., 129 N. C., 411.
Exception 17 is because the court charged “That the servant assumes the risk ordinarily incident to his employment, but he does not assume the risk from dangers which arise from the failure of the master to furnish his servant reasonably safe and suitable tools with which to do the work required of him unless in the careful performance of the work with the tools furnished the inherent probabilities of injury are greater than those of safety.” ■ The defendant admits that this language is substantially what was said in Hicks v. Manufacturing Co., 138 N. C., 319.
The 18th and last exception is because the court erred in instructing the jury, “Where the master fails in his 'duty to the injured servant, this failure is the proximate cause of the injury; the fact that the negligence of a fellow-servant also commingles with it as a proximate cause will not exonerate the master from liability.” This exception cannot be sustained. Thompson on Negligence, secs. 4856, 4857, 4858.
*460Tbis Court said in Ramsey v. R. R., 91 N. C., 418: “Tbe charge of tbe court, wben properly considered as a whole, was in accordance with tbe principle settled in tbe cases just cited. We are not permitted to select detached portions of tbe charge, even if in themselves subject to criticism, and assign errors as to them, wben, if considered with tbe other portions of tbe charge, they are readily explained and tbe charge in its entirety appears to be correct. Each portion of tbe charge must be construed with reference to what precedes and follows it.”
Tbe defendant excepted at tbe time of settling tbe case on appeal “for that tbe court, at tbe instance of tbe plaintiff, sent up tbe contentions of tbe parties as a part of tbe charge, and put in a large part of tbe testimony in tbe form of stenographer’s notes, instead of in narrative form.”. Tbis exception was in accordance with tbe provisions of Rule 22 of tbis Court, 140 N. C., 494, and complies with tbe repeated decisions thereon. Cressler v. Asheville, 138 N. C., 482. . As there was no point made on tbe judge’s reciting tbe contention of tbe parties, and they were not needed to enlighten tbe Court as to any of tbe exceptions, it was unnecessary to send them up, and it was also improper to send tbe stenographer’s notes up in tbe form of question and answer, but tbe evidence should have been stated in narrative form, as we have so often ruled. Tbe unnecessary matter thus sent up, we estimate at 40 printed pages, tbe cost of copying and printing which will be taxed against tbe appellee, as provided in Rule 22. Land Co. v. Jennett, 128 N. C., 3.
No error.