after stating tbe case: Tbe goods were found, in a damaged condition, in tbe possession of tbe Norfolk Southern Company, and bis Honor properly beld that tbis raised tbe presumption that tbey were injured by tbe negligence of tbat company. Manufacturing Co. v. R. R., 121 N. C., 514; Manufacturing Co. v. R. R., 128 N. C., 284; Meredith v. R. R., 137 N. C., 488.
Tbis presumption was sufficient, standing alone, and in tbe absence of other testimony, to sustain a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiff.
If evidence in rebuttal was offered, it was for tbe jury to determine its weight.
Recognizing tbis as a correct statement of tbe law, tbe Norfolk Southern Company has introduced evidence which, it contends, rebuts tbe presumption of negligence on its part.
Has it done so? If it has, there is no error in tbe trial. Tbe evidence is not as full as it ought to have been, and tbe failure of tbe Norfolk Southern Company to introduce one of its own employees on tbe train, to show tbat there was no accident or collision between Mackey’s Ferry and Elizabeth City, ought to have bad weight with tbe jury.
We cannot,, however, pass on tbe sufficiency of tbe evidence. Tbis is for tbe jury, and our duty ceases when we inquire whether there was evidence for their consideration. ¥e think there was.
Tbe goods were securely packed and crated at 'Washington City, and when tbey reached Elizabeth City tbe back end of tbe car was nearly empty, and tbe furniture was piled in tbe front end, broken and defaced.
Tbis would indicate tbat tbe injury did not occur in tbe ordinary operation of the train. No one could afford to ship furniture, nor would railroads be willing to accept it for carriage, if such damage usually occurred in tbe prudent management of their trains.
*75Tbe plaintiff testified, without objection, that the furniture looked like it had been in a collision.
The Norfolk and Southern Company offered evidence that the original seal on the car was unbroken, thus explaining its acceptance of the ear without protest, and that it received the car on 12th November, and delivered, it at Elizabeth City on 13th November, on schedule time.
The car was in the possession of the Coast Line Company from ten to fifteen days, and in the possession of the Norfolk Southern one day, and it had been transported by one from Eichmond to Plymouth, and by the other fifty-two miles.
The goods were in a car of the Atlantic Coast Line, and the seals were unbroken.
If there was evidence against the Coast Line Company that the injury was caused by an extraordinary event; that the car was in the possession of this company ten or fifteen days; that it transported the goods from Eichmond to Plymouth, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles; that the goods were delivered at Washington to the Norfolk and Southern Eail-way and arrived at Plymouth in a Coast Line car; and evidence in favor of the Norfolk Southern Company that it received the car on 12th November and delivered it on 13th November, at Elizabeth City, on schedule time, having possession of the car one day and carrying it fifty-two miles; and that the original seal was unbroken — was it not permissible to contend that the probabilities were greater that the injury occurred while in possession of the Coast Line Company?
There was evidence of these facts, and if, accepting them as true, the probability of injury by the Coast Line Company was more reasonable, it was for the jury to say what inference should be drawn from them. Fitzgerald v. R. R., 141 N. C., 534.
The evidence is not conclusive, and the jury would have been justified in finding that the presumption of negligence raised against the Norfolk Southern had not been rebutted, but we cannot say there was no evidence to support the verdict and judgment.
No error.