after stating the case: It is not clear that the plaintiff, Rena E. Braddy, is entitled to a life estate in the land in controversy, under the deed in trust. No estate, legal or equitable, is, in terms, conveyed to her, and a construction would be permissible that it was the purpose of the grantor to give her the rents and profits of the land for her support, and no more.
This question is not, however, raised by the appeal, and the case of Cox v. Jernigan, 154 N. C., 584, seems to sustain the contention of the plaintiff as to the extent of her interest.
Conceding, therefore, that she acquired an equitable estate for life under the deed, we are of opinion that this does not confer on her the right to have the value of this interest ascertained and delivered to her for her own use. As was said in Cox v. Williams, 58 N. C., 154, the owner of property “has the right to give it with such restrictions and upon such terms as he sees proper, and the courts are bound to carry his intentions into effect, unless there be something unlawful and against public policy.” We find nothing unlawful or against public policy in the deed, and the language used, as it seems to us, *34admits of but one construction as to tbe question in controversy.
Tbe land is conveyed to tbe trustee ip fee, under tbe act of 1879, and tbe trusts specifically declared. Authority is given to tbe trustee to convey to sucb person as tbe said Rena E. may designate, but tbis power is limited by tbe provision tbat tbe trustee must first determine tbat a change is desirable, so tbat tbe plaintiff cannot compel a conveyance against bis judgment, honestly exercised.
Tbe conveyance authorized is evidently one to consummate a sale of tbe property, as in tbe same sentence conferring tbe power tbe trustee is directed “to' invest tbe proceeds of sucb sale.” Tbe proceeds are to be invested in a suitable borne for tbe plaintiff, to be held “upon tbe same terms and conditions as hereinbefore mentioned,” and upon tbe death of tbe plaintiff tbe trust is to determine, and “tbe land and premises above described” are to belong to tbe heirs of tbe grantor “in fee simple absolute.” If tbe grantor bad tbe right to dispose of bis property as be wished, be could direct tbat it be sold, and, if sold, tbat tbe proceeds be invested on such terms as be thought wise and just.
He could give the use of it to tbe plaintiff during her life, and direct that it be held in its original form or as reinvested until her death, and then tbat it go to bis heirs. Tbe language indicates clearly tbat tbis was bis intention.
He does not say tbat a part of tbe land shall,go to tbe heirs, but “tbe land and premises above described,” meaning all of it.
If tbe construction contended for by tbe plaintiff should be adopted, a serious injustice might arise.
Tbe plaintiff is one of six children, all of whom are heirs of tbe grantor. At tbe time tbe deed was executed, in 1906, she was sixteen years of age, and is now twenty-one, and has an expectancy of 41.5 years. Tbe value of her life estate in tbe proceeds of tbe sale of tbe land ($2,000), based on her expectancy, would be about $1,500.
If tbis should be ascertained and turned over to her, and she should die within a year, tbe money would belong to her bus-*35band, and tbe five minor children, for whom tbe grantor intended property of tbe value of $2,000, would get $500.
We tbink tbe judgment was in accordance with law, and it is in all respects
Affirmed.