after stating the case. This case is governed by the decision of the Court in Bank v. Fountain, 148 N. C., p. 590, and affords a good illustration of the principles declared and approved in that opinion. A new trial was granted in Fountain’s case for the reason that after evidence had been offered tending to show fraud in the procurement of the note and the president *75of the bank in reply had testified in substance that the bank had purchased the note in due course and was endorsee for value before maturity and without notice, the judge below charged the jury, among other things, that the prima facie case of plaintiff, the holder of the note, had been restored by the uncontra-dicted evidence of the president of the bank that it had acquired the note in the usual course of business before maturity and without notice of any vice in it, thereby erroneously invading the province of the jury by assuming that the evidence of the bank president was true and should be so accepted by them. After holding that this was reversible error in the trial below the Court in the opinion, speaking further to the subject, said:
“It may be that when fraud is established in procuring the instrument or there has been evidence offered tending to establish it, if the plaintiff, as he is then required to do, should lay before the jury all the evidence available as to the transaction, and it should thereby appear with no evidence to the contrary and no other fair or reasonable inference permissible, that plaintiff was the purchaser of the instrument in good faith, for value, before maturity and without notice the court could properly charge the jury if they ‘believed the evidence’ or if they ‘found the facts to be as testified’ — a more approved form of expression — they would render a verdict for plaintiff. But here, the fraud having been established or having been alleged, and evidence offered to sustain it, the circumstances and bona fides of plaintiff’s purchase were the material questions in the controversy; and both the issue and the credibility of the evidence offered tending to establish the position of either party in reference to it was for the jury and not for the court. State v. Hill, 141 N. C., 771; Riley’s case, 113 N. C., 650.”
And in concluding the opinion, the Court again stated the position as follows: “If when all the facts attendant upon the transaction are shown, there is no fair or reasonable inference to the contrary permissible, the judge could charge the jury, if they believed the evidence, to find for plaintiff, the burden in such case having been clearly rebutted. But' the issue itself and the credibility of material evidence relevant to the inquiry is *76for the jury, and it constitutes reversible error for the court to decide the question and withdraw its consideration from the jury.”
The facts presented bring the present case clearly within the principles stated. All the officers of the bank who were conversant with the matter testified in effect that the bank was an endorsee for value before maturity and holder in due course of the instrument sued on. There was no evidence which contradicted or tended to contradict their testimony and the judge below properly charged the jury, “if they believed the evidence or if they found the facts to be as testified they would render a verdict for plaintiff.” There is no error and the judgment below is affirmed.
No error.