after stating the case. The plaintiff alleged, in his complaint filed in this action, that the dower of Ann E. Tayloe had been allotted many years ago and that the record of the said allotment had been lost. He sought to restore the record and to recover the Britton Moore tract of land as a part of the dower. In the action tried at April Term, 1909, of the Superior Court, when Judge Guión presided, the defendant denied that they were in possession of any land owned by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff acquired, by the deed from the trustees an interest in any such land. A survey was made to establish the dividing line between the land owned by the plaintiff and that owned by the defendant Carrie W. Tayloe. The jury, by their verdict, found that the line indicated by the letters A-B is the dividing line, and the court so adjudged. The effect of the verdict and judgment in that case is to estop the plaintiff from now asserting any title to the land lying on the east side of the line, or to any interest therein, as the court adjudged the feme defendant to be the owner of all the land on that side. There was no exception to the judgment or appeal therefrom. If the Britton Moore tract or any part of the dower land is, in fact, on the east side of that line, the plaintiff should have made it appear, so that the verdict would have been according to the truth of the matter. If he failed to do so by reason of any error of the court at the trial of the case, he should have excepted and appealed. If the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, he should have moved to set it aside. Having failed to impeach the verdict and judgment in any proper way, the plaintiff is bound by them and will not be heard in this action to contradict anything which was decided in the former suit upon the issues joined between the parties. The jury have found in this ease, it is true, that the Britton Moore tract was a part of the dower land as allotted *33to the widow, but they also find tbat it is on the west side o£ the line. If “west” should be “east/’ as suggested on the argument, the plaintiff is still estopped by the former verdict and judgment from claiming the land, as the jury further find tbat the feme defendant bad theretofore been adjudged to be' the owner of the Britton Moore tract of land. Tbe issues were raised by the pleadings and the verdict was in accordance with instructions given by the court, as to the legal effects of the records in the prior suits. We find no error in the charge of the court. We have shown tbat the identical question involved in this action has heretofore been decided against the plaintiff in a suit between the same parties. If we accept and consider the verdict as it appears in the record, and we must do so in the absence of any correction or amendment, it is perfectly consistent with the verdict and judgment as rendered at April Term, 1909, before Judge Guión. Tbe reference in tbat judgment to the judgment rendered at April Term, 1908, when Judge Allen presided, does not change its legal effect, for the latter judgment merely declared tbat the plaintiff is the owner of the dower land, without locating it, while the other judgment clearly ascertains tbat it is no part of the land on the east side of the line, as the feme defendant owns all the land on tbat side. Tbe plaintiff may have lost a part of bis land in the litigation, though it does not so appear, but if be has, we cannot restore it to him without disregarding a well-settled rule of law which protects the feme defendant in the ownership of the land once adjudged to be hers. We need not enter upon any lengthy discussion of the principle underlying the doctrine of estoppel by record or res judicata,. We simply refer to what is said by the Court in Bunker v. Bunker, 140 N. C., 18, when considering a question similar to the one presented by this appeal: “It being a final judgment, the plaintiffs cannot be beard upon any matter which was litigated in the action and which was necessarily determined by it. In such a case, the matter in dispute having passed in rem judicatam, the former decision is conclusive between the parties, if either attempts, by commencing another action or proceeding, to re-open the question. This doctrine is but an outgrowth of the familiar maxim *34that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause, and the other wholesome rule of the law that it is the interest of the State that there be an end of litigation, and consequently a matter of public concern that solemn adjudications of the courts should not be disturbed. Broom’s Legal Maxims (8 Ed.), 330, 331. ‘If,’ says Lord Kenyon, ‘an action be brought and the merits of the question be discussed between the parties and a final judgment obtained by either, the parties aré concluded and cannot canvass the same question in another action, although, perhaps, some objection or argument might have been urged upon the first trial, which would have led to a different judgment.’ Greathead v. Bromley, 7 Dunf. & East. (7 T. R.), 546. And again in another case, he says: ‘After a recovery by process of law, there must be an end of litigation; if it were otherwise there would be no security for any person, and great oppression might be done under the color and pretense of law.’ Marriott v. Hampton, 7 Dunf. & East., 269. ‘Good matter must be pleaded (or brought forward) in good form, in apt time, and in due order, otherwise great advantage may be lost.’ Coke, 303-b. If there be any one principle of law settled beyond all dispute, it is this, that whensoever a cause of action, in the language of the law, transit in rem judicatam, and the judgment thereupon remains in full force and unreversed, the original cause of action is merged and gone forever, and so it is, also, that if the plaintiff had an opportunity of recovering something in litigation formerly between him and his adversary, and but for the failure to bring it forward or to press it to a conclusion before the court, he might have recovered it in the. original suit; whatever does not for that reason pass into and become a part of the adjudication of the court is forever lost to him. U. S. v. Leffler, 11 Peters, 101. Judge Wittes thus__ states the rule: ‘Where the cause of action is the same and the plaintiff has had opportunity in the former suit of recovering that which he seeks to recover in the second, the former recovery is a bar to the latter action.’ Nelson v. Couch, 15 C. B. (N. S.), 108; (s. c., 109 E. C. L. R., 108). These principles have been fully adopted by us, as will appear in the case of Tyler v. Capeheart, 125 N. C., 64, where the doctrine as to the *35plea of former judgment is concisely and accurately stated.” In Tyler v. Capeheart it was held that “the judgment is decisive of the point raised by the pleadings, or which might properly be predicated upon them.” See also Turnage v. Joyner, 145 N. C., 81. The plaintiff is estopped by the judgment rendered at April Term, 1909, to allege that he is the owner of any land on the east side of the line A-B, or of any interest therein. Being concluded by the former judgment he cannot recover upon the cause of action stated in his complaint.
The fourth issue was properly submitted to the jury, as it involved a question of law and fact.
No error.