The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the evidence, considered in the view most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to be submitted to the jury to charge the defendant railroad company as an original promisor, upon an implied promise to pay the plaintiff the reasonable charges for the board and attention to Miss Hobbs. If not sufficient for this purpose, then the judgment of nonsuit should be sustained; and if sufficient, it should be reversed. It is too well settled to require the citation of sustaining authorities, that the statute of frauds “does not apply to the original promises or undertakings, though the benefit accrues to another than the promisor.” We think the evidence, considered in the view most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must consider it under the uniform rulings of this Court, sufficient to charge the defendant railroad company. The weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the reasonable deductions therefrom, must be left to the decision of a jury. The regulations, which we have quoted in the statement of the case, entitled Miss Hobbs — a member in good standing of the relief fund — to free medical treatment in one of the hospitals under the control of the defendant. The evidence offered clearly tends to prove that the resident medical director and the surgeon of the company, sent especially to take charge of her ease, were endeavoring, by direction of defendant’s superintendent, to carry out this express stipulation of the contract. The removal of Miss Hobbs from Hawthorne, Fla., tó Gaines-*194ville, Fla., and. to plaintiff’s hospital, was done by the orders of the superintendent and the medical director. We do not see that the conclusion of this Court in Barden v. R. R., 152 N. C., 318, in which we held a certain stipulation in the contract of membership to be void as in contravention of public policy, conflicts with our conclusion in the present case, that the evidence should have been submitted to and passed upon by a jury. If the defendant’s relief department, under that decision, is treated as an “association supported by the mutual contributions of employee and employer, maintained for the sole purpose of relieving and mitigating the suffering of its members — a charity whose noble purposes are untainted by selfish interest,” we cannot see how this conclusion absolves the defendant from the performance of its promise that its sick members shall be entitled to receive the benefit guaranteed by the contract to them. One of these benefits is free medical treatment in one of the hospitals under defendant’s control; “free medical treatment” means, of course, without cost to the disabled member. The place of treatment— one of the hospitals under its control — as between the member and the defendant, must mean the hospital to which the sick member is taken by the medical examiner of the defendant, as the member cannot be presumed to know what hospitals are under the control of the defendant.
It was stressed in the argument before us that the account offered by the plaintiff in evidence was made out to Miss Hobbs, and she was sued jointly with the defendant railroad company; and these facts conclusively proved that the plaintiff did not rely upon the implied promise of the defendant company and the credit was not extended solely upon that promise. These are evidential facts to be considered by the jury, but we do not think conclusive, in view of the other facts in evidence. 2 Page on Contracts, secs. 619, 632. It would be competent for the jury to give to them controlling weight, but we do not think that the law attaches to them such artificial weight as to make them conclusive. It was, also, suggested that the plaintiff could not sue into the contract between Miss Hobbs and the defendant railroad company, evidenced by her benefit certificate and the rules of the department. This is not the question presented, but the *195proper and sole question is, can a jury reasonably infer from tbe entire evidence an original promise to pay tbe plaintiff for its care of Miss Hobbs? Is tbe liability of tbe defendant primary? If so, then there can be no question that tbe service performed — tbe detriment or loss to tbe plaintiff — is a sufficient consideration to support tbe contract. 2 Page on Contracts, sec. 618. We, however, do not think it was competent to prove tbe account, by an itemized statement duly verified as prescribed in sec. 1625, Eevisal, as tbe action is not instituted “upon an account for goods sold and delivered.” There, however, was evidence offered of tbe services rendered and tbe length of time from which tbe jury could have found an amount fixed by them as the reasonable value of such services. The-judgment of non-suit is set aside and a new trial ordered.
New trial.