Tbe record contains no exception to tbe refusal of tbe trial judge to give special instructions, and no exception to bis Honor’s charge to tbe jury. Tbe entire, charge is included in tbe record, and it contains an able and elaborate presentation of tbe law of tbe case as applicable to facts as tbe jury should find them to be. The contentions of both State and the prisoner are stated fully and impartially. We have, therefore, a verdict resting upon a charge so clear and just and able that tbe learned counsel of tbe prisoner have not complained to us of any error in it prejudicial to tbe prisoner’s rights. Tbe errors assigned by tbe prisoner are directed solely to tbe admission of incompetent and tbe rejection of competent testimony.
Tbe trial judge permitted tbe prisoner’s wife to rehearse to tbe jury, in minute detail, everything she told tbe prisoner about tbe conduct of tbe deceased tbe night before. Tbe prisoner offered to prove as a substantive and independent fact tbe truth of tbe narrative by tbe wife, but this was excluded by bis Honor. His Honor’s ruling is, we think, clearly sustained by tbe decision of this Court in S. v. Banner, 149 N. C., 519, in which this Court held : “When tbe defense is a plea of insanity and not self-defense, a witness may not testify, as tending to show self-defense, that be bad seen deceased armed, on a dark night, a.t a place where tbe prisoner would likely pass, some two weeks before tbe occurrence, though be may testify that be bad told tbe prisoner concerning it, and what tbe prisoner said and did in consequence, only so far as it may affect tbe question of insanity, and for that purpose alone.”
In People v. Wood, 126 N. Y., 249, Judge Peckham, in a learned and elaborate opinion, held that it was competent for a defendant to offer evidence of communication made to him (in that case, the communications offered were of a similar character to those in this ease), “for tbe purpose of showing an adequate cause for tbe state of mind existing subsequent to tbe communication. Tbe subsequent conduct, appearance and conversation of tbe person to whom tbe communication is made ai’e tbe proper subjects of proof, for the one purpose of showing what effect upon him such communications bad, and that it rendered him insane within tbe legal definition of the term at the very time of tbe commission of tbe deed.” The evidence was held competent, “for tbe reason that all tbe facts are material for tbe purpose of enabling tbe jury to say what was tbe condition of mind of defendant when the deed was perpetrated.” This being tbe sole purpose of tbe evidence, tbe truth or falsity of tbe communication is not material, and it is not competent to in*838quire"into it. It'is, of course, competent to challenge the fact of communication, but not its truth or falsity.
In the present case, his Honor permitted the jn’isoner to show-in minute detail the communication to him by his wife, and his conduct, appearance, utterances and acts immediately thereafter and to the time of the homicide. This was, in our opinion, as far as it was permissible to go. There was no evidence of any disorder of the brain prior to the morning of 9 September, the day of the homicide; the evidence tended to show the prisoner to be a man possessed of an ordinarily normal mind, except occasional outbursts when intoxicated. In a few hours after the homicide, the prisoner’s mind seemed to recover its balance and to resume its normal condition. It was the contention of the prisoner that the sudden “brain storm,” which was so violent as to dethrone reason and make him irresponsible for his acts, was caused by his wife’s communication. Of its truth or falsity he could know nothing, and could not have been influenced by such knowledge. The theory of the defense and its plea is that he •believed it so strongly and so absolutely that the prisoner was made insane. If the purpose was to show the character of the deceased for violence, it was inadmissible, because it did not fall within one of the exceptions to the rule settled in this State for admitting such evidence. S. v. Banner, supra ; S. v. Turpin, 77 N. C., 473; S. v. Byrd, 121 N. C., 688; S. v. McIver, 125 N. C., 646. In our opinion, therefore, the offered testimony of the wife that the occurrence communicated by her to the prisoner, her husband, was true as an independent and substantive fact, was properly excluded.
Nor do we think there was error in refusing to permit ihe prisoner’s wife to give her reason for going to the house of deceased for her husband, whom she had seen, early in the morning of the homicide, go there with the deceased, and before she had communicated to him the occurrences of the night before. She testified that she saw her husband walk with the deceased to his house, that she went after him, called him out of the house," and they walked together to their home.
The jirisoner objected to certain testimony offered by the State, that when drinking he was violent in speech and conduct. The State offered evidence tending to show that prisoner was “two-thirds” drunk on the morning of the homicide. The prisoner, not having been at the trial examined as a witness, offered testimony of his good character. It was competent for him to do so. S. v. Hice, 117 N. C., 782. This evidence offered by the State as to the effect produced upon prisoner by whiskey was directed to his plea of “transitory insanity.” ¥e cannot *839see tbat its admission was prejudicial to tbe prisoner or tbat it was incompetent for tbe purpose it was offered. If tbe answers of some of tbe witnesses were not responsive, or not, in themselves, competent, tbe prisoner’s right was to move to strike out sueb answers and to request bis Honor to direct tbe jury not to consider sueb answers in reaching their verdict. ¥e have carefully read tbe entire record and examined all tbe cases cited by tbe learned counsel of tbe prisoner, and we find no error committed at tbe trial prejudicial to tbe prisoner’s rights. Tbe jury of bis county, who saw the witnesses and their demeanor, who beard tbe entire testimony, have, by their verdict, given to tbe sudden “brain storm” of tbe prisoner, created by bis wife’s communication, such weight and influence as to acquit the prisoner of tbe capital felony, but not to acquit him of all responsibility for his act. ¥e find no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
No error.