after stating the case: We do not well see how there could be any doubt or uncertainty as to the authority of the city of Salisbury to issue the bonds, the validity of which is now questioned by the plaintiff. It sufficiently appears by the journals of the House of Eepresentatives and the Senate that the bill, as it was first introduced, became the act as finally ratified, enrolled and transmitted to the office of the Secretary of State, all of which will appear from the numbers of the bill as it passed its several readings. There was nothing in the journal to show that it was ever amended in any way. The judge below has found as a fact, and it is not controverted, so far as it appears in the case and the briefs of counsel, that the only bill introduced in the Legislature pertaining to the issuing of bonds by the city of Salisbury during the session of 1907 was a bill to be entitled “An act to allow the city of Salisbury to issue bonds,” it being the same title as found in the bill which was ratified and sent to the office of the Secretary of State from the House and Senate, in both of which branches of the Legislature the numbers of the bill correspond in every respect. It is evident that the clerk of the House entered in his journal the title of the bill *472as it appeared on tbe back of tbe bill, and not tbe title as it appeared on tbe face of tbe bill. Tbe two titles, as tbey appear in tbe case, are not substantially different, so as to disprove tbe identity of tbe bill wben it passed its several readings in botb bouses. It is perfectly clear, from wbat appears in tbe facts as stated by bis Honor, tbat tbe same bill wbicb was introduced in tbe House and passed its several readings in tbat body, in perfect accordance with tbe requirements of tbe Constitution, is tbe one wbicb also passed tbe Senate in tbe- same way and was finally ratified, as prescribed by law, and transmitted to tbe .Secretary of State. Tbis is easily demonstrated by a bare statement of tbe facts, and no argument or discussion by us is required to establish tbe fact tbat tbe members of botb bouses understood distinctly and clearly tbe provisions of tbe bill as tbus passed and ratified. It would be a perversion of law and justice if we should permit an' erroneous statement of tbe true title of tbe bill, wbicb is to be found on its back, to control tbe title as found on tbe face of tbe bill, and tbe provisions of tbe bill itself, so as to nullify wbat was done by tbe Legislature. In the case of Improvement Co. v. Commissioners, 146 N. C., 353, it being a case very much in point, tbe name, “Robeson County,” in the title of tbe act, was changed to “Washington County” on one of its readings in tbe House. In that case we held: “It is apparent tbat tbe words ‘Washington County’ were intended for ‘Robeson County’ and is a mere clerical error. Tbe number of tbe bill in its passage through tbe House, and tbe fact tbat tbe same bill, bearing House number 1483, passed tbe Senate under its proper title and was duly enrolled under said title and its proper House and Senate numbers, clearly prove'that the words ‘Washington County’ were intended for ‘Robeson County.’ ” We now affirm tbat decision, and it applies directly and conclusively to tbe facts of tbis case. Wben tbe bill was passed on its several readings in each of tbe bouses, it should have been read, and we must presume tbat it was read, according to tbe title and provisions of tbe bill itself as tbey appear on its face, and not according to tbe title appearing on tbe back of tbe bill. Anyone having legislative experience must know tbat, under tbe facts and circumstances of tbis case, no member of either bouse, who are generally presumed to be men of a high order of intelligence, could have misunderstood wbat be was doing wben be voted in favor of tbe passage of tbe bill, and tbis would seem to be tbe crucial test by wbicb to determine whether tbe bill was passed intelligently and in accordance with tbe requirements of tbe Constitution and with tbe due observance of legislative procedure.
*473We bare no doubt as to tbe second point made in tbe case. Tbe bill authorized tbe city of Salisbury to issue bonds to an amount not exceeding $300,000, tbe issue in tbe first year not to exceed $100,000 and in any subsequent year not to exceed $50,000, until tbe entire amount of bonds, as designated in tbe bill or act of tbe Legislature and authorized by tbe latter, bad been exhausted. It was a very wise provision, in tbe first place, to make, because it is manifest tbe city authorities did not, at tbe time tbe bill was introduced and tbe act was passed, know tbe exact amount that would be required for tbe purposes stated in tbe bill, and therefore it was so worded that they could issue tbe required amount within tbe limit prescribed by tbe bill or act. It would have been folly to have designated tbe particular amount, when it -might have turned out by actual experience thereafter that such an amount was not required. Tbe substantial effect of tbe act is to authorize' tbe said authorities to issue $300,000 in bonds, if so much was required for tbe purposes set forth in tbe bill; and if it turned out that not so much would be required, then for such an amount as would be actually' required for tbe uses and purposes of tbe city prescribed in tbe act.
Nor do we think it could be successfully contended that a special election was intended to be required for each issue of tbe bonds. It is manifest, from tbe very terms of tbe act, that tbe Legislature intended only one election, and conferred upon tbe city tbe authority to issue bonds for its uses and purposes, as designated in tbe act, but within tbe limit of $300,000. What good would be accomplished by having three or four special elections, when it was within tbe power of tbe Legislature to authorize tbe issue* of tbe bonds by one election, to tbe extent of $300,000, if so much was required for tbe use of tbe city? If it bad been intended that there should be as many elections as there were issues of bonds, tbe Legislature should certainly have expressed such an intention in clearer language than is to be found in this bill. It was for tbe very purpose of saving cost and expense to the city that tbe act was worded as it is. There are authorities sustaining our construction of tbe act, but it is so palpable that no other construction is permissible that we refrain from citing them. Tbe mere fact that tbe bonds were to be issued for different purposes cannot affect or change tbe mean--ing of tbe act as we have declared it to be. There is no question made as to tbe regularity or validity of tbe election, except that tbe ordinance calling an election and tbe notice of tbe election are not specific. Without discussing this objection, we need only say that it is untenable, as it appears in both papers that tbe *474time of the election is clearly stated, and a sufficient opportunity to register and vote was given to all of the qualified voters of the city, and that the requirements of the act were substantially if not fully complied Avith by the city authorities. The amount to be issued in each year was not necessary to be stated in the call for or the notice of the election, as that was to be determined according to the very terms of the act, by the board of aldermen, and it would have been well nigh impossible to have ascertained what amount would have been needed in each year until after the election had been held. As to the date of the maturity of the bonds, it was not necessary that this should be stated in the call or notice, because the act also refers that matter to the determination of the board of aldermen. But it would seem that all these matters were specifically stated in the call for and notice of election, and that every voter understood full well the proposition for which he'was casting his vote.
We have examined this case very carefully, the’ record and briefs of counsel, and the authorities bearing upon the questions at issue, 'and have concluded that there is no error in the. judgment of the court below, over which Judge B. F. Long presided.
Affirmed.