after stating the case: On the trial it was made to appear tbat, on 30 August, 1904, a judgment was obtained in a justice’s court against the male defendant for $200 and interest, the summons and judgment reciting tbat it was for the purchase money of the land in controversy, and same was duly docketed in the Superior Court of Beaufort County the day following, 31 August. A ven. ex. issued, in the form provided by the statute ^(Eevisal, see. 627), and the property was advertised by the sheriff, when the feme defendant instituted her action in the Superior Court of Beaufort County against her husband, J. T. Swain, the plaintiff in the judgment, and the sheriff, and filed a complaint, alleging, in substance, tbat she and her husband bad bought this property for a home, and tbat, of the balance due for purchase money, $150, the male defendant bad paid *359nothing, but that sbe berself had paid the debt down to $50, which last sum her husband had paid off with his own money, and there was nothing due for the purchase money of the land, and they did not owe the plaintiff in the judgment anything, except for professional services, and the entire proceedings was a scheme on the part of her husband and the plaintiff in the judgment to deprive herself and children of their home, and asked that the sale be restrained and her own and children’s rights in the property declared and established. These allegations were fully denied by the parties charged, and at December Term, 1905, the cause coming on for hearing, the same was compromised and adjusted, and pursuant thereto judgment was entered as follows:
“This cause coming on to be heard at December Term, 1905, before his Honor, Thomas J. Shaw, Judge presiding, the parties being present in person, with their attorneys: It is now, by consent of both parties, given in open court, considered and adjudged that the -matters in controversy, as recited in the pleadings, be settléd and adjudicated as follows: That the defendant J. T. Swain execute a deed to his children, George S. Swain, Mary M. Swain, Jesse T. Swain and David Sylvester Swain, conveying to- them and their heirs, in fee simple, the lot or parcel of land described in the deed from C. S. Doughty and wife to J. T. Swain, recorded in the register’s office of Beaufort County, in book 93, pp. 352-353, which is hereby referred to, saving and reserving unto the said Martha A. Swain and J. T. Swain, jointly, an estate for the remainder of their natural lives in the said land and for the life of the survivor of them. Upon failure of defendant to execute such deed, this judgment shall operate as a conveyance in lieu thereof.
“It is further ordered that the judgment against the property referred to in the pleadings be reduced to $100, together with such interest and costs as have accrued thereon,- and that the same is declared in full force and effect.
“It is further ordered that each party pay his or her proper costs of this suit, to be taxed by the clerk, and that the temporary restraining order heretofore granted be dissolved.
“Thos. J. Shaw,
“Judge Presiding.”.
*360Default baying been made in tbe payment of tbis judgment of $100, a ven. ex. was issued, in proper form, tbe property sold, and tbe plaintiff in tbe present suit became tbe purchaser and took a deed for tbe property, wbicli is tbe title under which be makes tbe present claim. On these facts tbe Court is of opinion that tbe plaintiff was entitled to recover tbe property, and tbe ruling of bis Honor below to that effect should be sustained.
It was objected chiefly on part of feme defendant that, inasmuch as it appears on tbe face of tbe record that feme defendant was and is a married woman, no valid judgment could be obtained against her, and that tbe same should not be allowed to Stand. There are decisions in tbis State to tbe effect that when it appears on tbe face of tbe pleadings that a defendant was a married woman at tbe time a contract was entered into, and judgment in personam lias been entered against her, tbe same will be set aside on direct application, though tbe defense of coverture was not formally pleaded. Green v. Ballard, 116 N. C., 144, cited with approval in Moore v. Wolfe, 122 N. C., 711. It was not required in these cases to decide whether such a judgment was void or only voidable, and in that event effective until set aside, where innocent third parties were concerned. And there are well-considered decisions with us to tbe effect that while a judgment against a married woman stands as -tbe formal and final deliverance of a court having, jurisdiction of tbe causes and tbe parties, tbe same is binding upon her. Grantham v. Kennedy, 91 N. C., 148; Vick v. Pope, 81 N. C., 22; Greene v. Branton, 16 N. C., 504.
There is doubt, however, if tbe principle referred to in these authorities is involved here at all; for, in order to uphold his title, tbe present plaintiff is not required to resort to any judgment in personam against the feme defendant, and be has made no effort to do so. The title to tbe property was in the husband of feme defendant, and the creditor had a valid judgment against tbe husband, duly docketed and showing on its face that it was for the purchase money. Nothing has. ever occurred to destroy or weaken the binding force of this judgment to the amount of $100 and interest, the amount outstanding when tbe sheriff’s sale took place; on the contrary, in the suit instituted by the feme defendant to establish tbe interest of herself and children *361in this property the consent decree recognizes the validity of this judgment and declares, in express terms, in reference to it: “It is further ordered that this judgment be reduced to $100, together with such interest and costs as have accrued thereon, and that the same is declared in full force and eíféct.” The judgment further directs that the husband shall execute a deed to the children of these parties, in fee simple, subject to a life estate reserved to the husband and the wife and the survivor of them. Under and by virtue of this judgment against the husband, which has always been a binding lien upon the land, the lot was sold and the present plaintiff became the purchaser, and, in our opinion, as stated, the sheriff’s deed, made under and by virtue of this sale, conveyed to him a good title.
No evidence has ever been offered which shows or tends to show that any separate estate of the feme defendant has ever been invested in this property, and even the allegations to this effect in her. original suit against the creditor and her husband in regard to this matter are very vague and unsatisfactory. On the contrary, as will be noted in the case on appeal, the feme defendant, under a general denial in the answer, rests her claim •on the rights arising to her under and by virtue of the very decree we are now asked to ignore and set aside. This decree, as we have seen, recognizes the validity of the judgment under which the present plaintiff purchased, and no principle of law or equity would require or permit that the feme defendant should assert her claim to the property under one clause of an entire judgment and repudiate a lien upon it declared and established by another.
Even if there were facts presented giving indication of an equity in her favor, the same could not be entertained on the present pleadings, which, as stated, contains the ordinary allegations in an action to recovei’ land and a general denial on the part of defendant. Webb v. Borden, 145 N. C., 188; Buchanan v. Harrington, 141 N. C., 39.
There is no error, and the judgment below is affirmed.
No Error.