after stating the case: The Constitution .of this State (Art. IX, sec. 3) provides “that each county of the State shall be divided into a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be maintained at least four *121montbs in every year, and if tbe commissioners of any county shall fail to comply witb tbe aforesaid requirement of tbis section tbey shall be liable to indictment.”
Construing tbis section, in Collie v. Commissioners, 145 N. C., 170, the Court held that the duty of the county commissioners to provide by taxation for maintaining the public school for the minimum period of four montbs was not affected by the restrictions on the power of taxation contained in Articles V and YII of the Constitution; and from tbis it follows that the requirements of section 3, Article IS, to the extent indicated, are peremptory, and a failure on the part of the commissioners to perform,the duty thereby imposed is or must be made an indictable offense. Tbe provisions of our statute law are ample to mate tbis feature of the Constitution effective by indictment (Revisal, secs. 3590-3592), and there are, no doubt, other sections of the criminal code bearing on the subject, and the question presented on tbis appeal is whether the duty referred to can be enforced by writ of mandamus, the writ applied for by plaintiff in tbis proceeding. As relevant to tbis question, and on facts appearing in the record, it is recognized doctrine that the writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce the performance of duty on the part of county officials, when the duty in question is both peremptory and explicit, but that such a writ will not be granted to compel the performance of an act “involving the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the officer to whom its performance is committed.” In some of the boobs the principle is stated in tbis way, “that the writ is only allowable when the duty is mandatory and the act sought to be coerced is ministerial in its nature”; and while expressions are sometimes found that the performance of a duty to some extent discretionary will be controlled by tbis writ when it clearly appears that an officer has acted capriciously, an examination of these authorities will, we think, disclose that in cases involving the exercise of official discretion the order of the court in actions for mandamus has always been restricted to compelling an officer to act in a given case, and will never undertake to direct him as to bow be shall act.
*122In Abbott on Municipal Colorations, sec. 1108, tbe principle is tbus stated: “To authorize tbe writ, tbe duty must be mandatory and tbe act sought to be coerced ministerial in its nature. If tbe officer or governmental agency sought to be coerced is vested by law with discretionary powers as to tbe doing or not doing of tbe act sought to be codrced, or in the manner of doing it, tbe writ will not issue.” And in High on Extr. Legal Remedies (2d Ed.), sec. 24, it is said: “But tbe most important principle to be observed in tbe exercise of tbe jurisdiction by mandamus, and one which lies at the very foundation of tbe entire system of rules and principles regulating tbe use of this extraordinary remedy, is that which fixes tbe distinction between duties of a peremptory or mandatory nature and those which are discretionary in their character, involving tbe exercise of some degree of judgment on tbe part of tbe officer or body against whom the mandamus is sought. * '* * And whenever such officers or bodies are vested with discretionary powers as to tbe performance of any duty required at their bands, or when in reaching a given resulted official action they are necessarily obliged to use some degree of judgment and discretion, while mandamus will lie to set them in motion and to compel action upon the matters in controversy, it will in no manner interfere with the exercise of such discretion or control or dictate tbe judgment or decision which shall be reached.” And again, in section 34: “An important distinction to be observed in the outset, and which will more fully appear hereafter, is that between duties which are peremptory and absolute, and hence merely ministerial in their nature, and those which involve the exercise of some degree of official discretion and judgment upon tbe part of tbe officers charged with their performance. As regards tbe latter class of duties, concerning which the officer is vested with discretionary powers, while the writ may properly command him to act or may • set him in motion, it will not further control or interfere with his action, nor will it direct him to act in any.specific manner.”
The doctrine so stated is in accord with the uniform decisions of this Court on the subject. Ward v. Commissioners, 146 N. C., 534; Glenn v. Commissioners, 139 N. C., 412; Barnes v. *123 Commissioners, 135 N. C., 27; Ewbank v. Turner, 134 N. C., 77; Loughran v. Hickory, 129 N. C., 281; Tate v. Commissioners, 122 N. C., 812; Burton v. Furman, 115 N. C., 166; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244.
In the well-considered opinion of Associate Justice MacRae, in Burton v. Furman, supra, it is said: “Neither will t-bis writ (mandamus) be granted to compel the performance of an act involving an exercise of judgment .and discretion on the part of the officer to wbom its performance is committed. Tbe law is so thoroughly settled in this State by the former adjudications of the Court tbat we bave nothing to do but refer to them.” And the learned Justice then quotes with approval from the opinion of Justice Bynum, in Brown v. Turner, 70 N. C., 93, to this effect: “Mandamus will lie when the act required to be done is imposed by’law, is merely ministerial, the relator has a clear right and is without any other adequate remedy. Moses on Mandamus, 68. But it does not lie where judgment and discretion are to be exercised, nor to control the officer in the manner of conducting the general duties of bis office.”
An application of these authorities to the facts appearing in the record requires tbat the order of the judge denying plaintiff’s prayer for a mandamus should be affirmed. Tbe question presented, the amount of. taxes to be levied to maintain the public schools of Cherokee County for the minimum period of four months, is one which clearly involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, which our Constitution and statute law bave thus far referred to the board of commissioners of the several counties, and the courts cannot and should not undertake to control their decision. In this view, the recent case before the Court, Ward v. Commissioners, seems to be directly in point. Tbat was a ease in which certain citizens and taxpayers of Beaufort County applied f.or a mandamus to compel the county commissioners to build a sufficient courthouse for the county, and on the bearing it was found as a fact tbat “Tbe commissioners bave not kept and maintained in good and sufficient repair the courthouse of the county, and do not offer or propose to do so.” Relief by mandamus was denied, and Chief Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “A mandamus *124will not lie to compel the county commissioners to repair or build a courthouse. The duty of providing a sufficient and proper courthouse is to be discharged by the county commissioners, subject to indictment if there is a willful failure, and to supervision of the people of the county in the election of another board of commissioners, should the voters see fit. It is not a duty resting for enforcement with the Judge of the Superior Court nor subject to suiiervision by the court. The plaintiff has no specific legal right for the enforcement of which he can invoke an order of the judicial branch of the G-overmnent to supervise and control the administrative branch. The building a new courthouse or repairing an old one is not a mere ministerial matter, admitting of ho debate, but is one of discretion, committed to the county commissioners, in regard to which their judgment and discretion must prevail, and not the opinion of a judge. Only when a grand jury and jury have found a criminal abuse of duty can the court intervene, and then only to punish the individuals — not to compel them, as officials, to do any specific act not required by statute to be done in a specific way or to a prescribed extent. In Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, Pearson, G..J., discussed this subject, and said: ‘The case before us is within the power of the county commissioners. How can this Court undertake to control its exercise? Can we say such a bridge does not need repairs, or that in building a new bridge near the site of an old bridge it should be erected, as heretofore, upon posts, so as to be cheap, but warranted to last some years, or that it is better policy to locate it a mile or so above, where the banks are good abutments, and to have stone pillars, at a heavier outlay at the start, but such as will insure permanence and be cheaper in the long run? In short,’ the Court continued, ‘this Court is not capable of controlling the exercise of power on the part of the General Assembly or of the county authorities, and it cannot assume to do so without putting itself in antagonism as well to the General Assembly as to the county authorities and erecting a despotism of five men, which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our Government and the usage of all times past. For the exercise of powers conferred by the Constitution the people must *125rely upon the honesty of the members of the General Assembly and of the persons elected to fill places of trust in the several counties. This Court has no'power, and is not capable if it had the power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative department of the Government or. upon the county authorities.’ ”
It is argued for plaintiff that this decision does not apply, because the question there involved was clearly one of discretion, “whether the courthouse provided was sufficient,” while here the duty to maintain a public 'school for four months is peremptory and permits no discretion. But the argument does not correctly state the question presented. It is not, shall the school be maintained for four months? but how much money is required to be raised by taxation for the purpose indicated; and this, as stated, is a matter which does involve both judgment- and discretion, and which cannot be controlled by the courts in an action of this character, but has been wisely referred by the law to the board of county commissioners. Having general charge and supervision of the county affairs, they best know the circumstances and" needs of its people and all the conditions that enter into the problem — the valuation of the property in the county, the amount likely to be realized from a given levy, and the amount available or to be expected from other sources. Moreover, acting as they do under a continuing sense of responsibility to the people who elected them, and liable to indictment in case of willful or negligent failure to perform their duties, they are the body best fitted for the management of these local affairs and most likely to give satisfactory results. Even when the power exists, the courts are most reluctant to interfere, and will never do so by civil process, unless the local officers fail or refuse to act at all, or unless their action is so unreasonable as to amount to a manifest and oppressive abuse of discretion. Rosenthal v. Goldsboro, 149 N. C., 128; Railroad v. Commissioners, 148 N. C., 220.
It is further argued that, as the county board of education, acting under the provisions of the statute (Revisal, sec. 4112), have submitted an estimate of the amount required to maintain the public schools during the year 1909 for the minimum period *126of four mouths, this is ascertained as a definite fact, and thereupon the duty of the county commissioners to levy a tax sufficient to raise the amount has become both peremptory and specific, bringing the case under the principle declared and upheld in Tate v. Commissioners, supra. But the objection to this position is that under the law in question the estimate made by the board of education is not final and conclusive, but the amount is referred to the board of county commissioners for ultimate decision and, as we have endeavored to show, in the exercise of their discretion, and is not, therefore, a fixed sum or definite tax rate, as in Tate v. Commissioners. This, we think, is clearly the proper interpretation of the statute under which this estimate was submitted. Both our constitutional provisions and general legislation on the subject establish and approve the principle and policy of local regulation for these matters of local concern, not to be departed from, except in cases of great and overruling necessity; and. a statute should never be construed as infringing upon this principle of local self-government unless explicit in terms and clearly sanctioned' by the Constitution. Not only is this not true of the statute in question here, but the section itself throughout gives clear indication .that, notwithstanding the estimate made by the board of education, the question of amount is for the county commissioners to determine: “If the tax levied by the State be insufficient to maintain one or more public-schools in each district for four months, then the board of commissioners shall levy annually a special tax to supply the deficiency,” etc. * * * “The taxes shall be levied on the property, credits and polls of the county, and in the assessment of the amount on each the commissioners shall observe the constitutional equation.” And in the conclusion of the section it is directed: “The county board of education, on or before the annual meeting of the commissioners for levying county taxes, shall make an estimate of the amount of money necessary to maintain the schools for four months and subrnit it to the board of county commissioners.”
One of the more usual definitions of the term “submit” is to “commit to the discretion or judgment of another,” and the term “estimate” tends to show that the action of the board of *127education was intended, at most, to bave only persuasive force, and, taken together, “to make an estimate of the amount and submit it to the board of county commissioners,” clearly shows that it was submitted for their consideration only, and that the determination of the question was with them. School District v. Omaha, 58 N. W., 442.
We are of opinion that the judge below has put the correct interpretation upon the statute, and that his judgment dismissing the action should be
Affirmed.