after stating the case: Where a motion to dismiss an action is made, under the statute, the evidence must be construed in the view most favorable to the plaintiff, and every fact which it tends to prove, and which is an essem tial ingredient of the cause of action, must be taken as estab-' *230lished, as the jury, if the case had been, submitted to them, might have found those facts from the testimony. Brittain v. Westhall, 135 N. C., 492. Applying this rule, we think there was evidence in the case proper for the consideration of the jury upon the question of negligence. The duty of the employer to his employee is thus stated in Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N. C., 290: “The.employer does not guarantee the safety of his employee. Tie is not bound to furnish him an absolutely safe place to work in, but is required simply to use reasonable care and prudence in providing such a place. He is not bound to furnish the best known machinery, implements and appliances, but only such as are reasonably fit and safe and as are in general use. He meets the requirements of the law if, in the selection of machinery and appliances, he uses that degree of care which a man of ordinary prudence would use, having regard to his own safety, if he were supplying them for his own personal use. It is culpable negligence which makes the employer liable, not a mere error of judgment. We believe this is substantially the rule which has been recognized as the correct one and recommended for our guide in all such- cases. It measures accurately the duty of the employer and fixes the limit of his responsibility to bis employee,” citing Harley v. B. C. M. Co., 142 N. Y., 31. So that the liability of the employer to the employee in damages for any injury the latter’ may receive, while engaged' in his work, depends upon whether the employer has been negligent. Avery v. Lumber Co., 146 N. C., 592; Berkley v. Waste Co., 141 N. C., 585. In respect to instrumentalities provided by the master for the use of the servant, the latter, in order to establish his case, must show: 1. That the implement furnished by the master was, at the time of the injury, defective. 2. That the master knew of the defect or was negligent in not discovering it and making the needed repairs. 3. That the defect was the proximate cause of the injury. Hudson v. R. R., 104 N. C., 491; Shaw v. Manufacturing *231 Co., 143 N. C., 131; R. R. v. Barrett, 166 U. S., 617. We may omit any reference to the duty of tbe servant to inform the master of any defect found by him, as there is no evidence in this case that fixes the plaintiff with any knowledge of the alleged defect in the truck, either in law or in fact. There is another dirty the master owes to his servant and that is to inspect, at reasonable intervals of time, the implements he furnishes for use by his servant. I Labatt M. & S., sec. 154 and 157; Bailey’s Pers. Inj., sec. 2638; Leak v. R. R., 124 N. C., 455. At what intervals this inspection should be made, will depend upon the kind of implement used and the special facts and circumstances of the case. The defendant alleges in the answer that the pin was not in the spindle and for that reason the wheel fell off and, further, that the plaintiff should have known that the pin was missing; but there is no evidence to sustain this allegation. The defendant’s own witness testified that the pin was “somewhat worn,” and that “both ends of the pin were bent down flat on the spindle and the wheel had drawn off over the pin.”
We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the pin had not been weakened by being worn and was strong enough to hold the wheel in its place on the spindle. The truck was being moved in the ordinary and usual ivay, so far as appears, and in the proper place. As it gave way, under the circumstances, and was worn by constant use, the jury might well have; inferred, as they did, that it was either originally defective and insufficient or had become so by being “somewhat worn.” It was for the jury to say whether, by a careful inspection, the defendant could have discovered its defective condition. We must assume, in the absence of the charge of the Court, that they were properly instructed as to this feature of the case. In Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind., 181, the Court holds: It is the duty of the master to use ordinary care and diligence to provide safe and suitable machinery for use by the servant whom he employs to work upon it. The master’s duty does *232not end with providing safe and suitable machinery, but he is also bound to exercise a reasonable supervision over it, and to exercise ordinary care in keeping it in safe condition for use by his servants, and this duty he cannot rid himself of by casting it upon an agent. It is only ordinary care that must be exercised by the master, such care as the peculiar conditions- and circumstances would suggest to a man of ordinary prudence, but this requires that he should take notice of the liability of an implement he places in the hands of his servant to become worn and unsafe from age and use. See also Parsons v. R. R., 94 Mo., 286; Hackett v. Manufacturing Co., 101 Mass., 101; R. R. v. Holt, 29 Kansas, 149, and Bailey’s Pers. Inj., sec. 2634-2638, where the subject is fully discussed. In Hackett v. Manufacturing Co., supra, it was held that whether an employer, was negligent in not ascertaining that a chain which operated an elevator had been worn and become thinner and therefore unsafe, by reason of which the elevator fell and injured the plaintiff, was a proper question for the jury. The same authorities also sustain the proposition that the .plaintiff, when he was ordered by Vernon to use the truck, had the right to assume that it was in a safe condition.
Our conclusion is that the Court properly submitted the case to the jury upon the evidence.
No error.