Hollowell v. Borden, 148 N.C. 255 (1908)

May 29, 1908 · Supreme Court of North Carolina
148 N.C. 255

W. R. HOLLOWELL v. E. B. BORDEN et al., Trustees of the Goldsboro Graded Schools.

(Filed 29 May, 1908.)

1. Municipal Corporations — School Districts — Constitutional Law.

A legally qualified board of trustees of the graded schools of a town is a municipal corporation within the meaning and purport Of Article VII, section 7, of the State Constitution.

2. Same — Debts Contracted — Public Schools — Special Purpose — Vote of the People.

The expense of a public-school system of a town is not a necessary municipal expense, and a bond issue to pay a debt contracted for that purpose, to be constitutional, must be submitted to a vote of the qualified voters of the township. Laws 1905, ch. 533, sec. 14. (Collie v. Commissioners, 145 N. 0., 170, cited and distinguished. )

ActioN heard before W. R. Allen, J., at chambers, from WayNe.

This action is brought by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and other taxpayers of Goldsboro Township for the purpose *256of restraining tbe defendants from issuing bonds. Upon tbe bearing tbe injunction was refused, and plaintiff appealed.

Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe Court.

F. A. Daniels for plaintiff.

A. G. Davis for defendants.

BrowN, J.

At tbe special session of tbe General Assembly of 1908 an act was passed (chapter 31, Private Acts) empowering “tbe trustees of tbe Goldsboro -Graded Schools to borrow tbe sum of $30,000 to pay for a site and for building a school building for tbe Wayne County High School, to be run in connection with the Goldsboro Graded Schools, and to issue therefor bonds of tbe denomination of $100 each,” etc.

In pursuance of this act tbe defendants have undertaken to issue $20,000 in bonds of tbe denomination of $1,000 each.

Tbe objection made to tbe validity of the act and of tbe bonds issued in pursuance thereof is that no election is provided for, and that none has been 'held, submitting this b md issue to tbe qualified voters of Goldsboro Township.

We think tbe objection is well taken and that bis Honor should have granted tbe injunction.

It is properly admitted in tbe brief of tbe learned counsel for defendants, as well as that, of tbe plaintiff, that tbe Board of Trustees of tbe Goldsboro Graded Schools of Goldsboro Township is a municipal corporation within the meaning and purport of Article VII of tbe Constitution of this State.

We have held that, “under a statute authorizing municipal corporations to issue bonds, a school district is properly called a municipal corporation,-according to tbe modern use of tbe term, and as such may obligate itself by bonds issued under such a statute.” Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N. C., 151.

The same ease classifies school districts as being among those municipal corporations that come within tbe scope of section Y, Article VII, prohibiting tbe contracting of debts without submitting tbe question to the qualified voters.

*257It is contended that no special tax is necessary to pay these bonds or the interest on them. That is immaterial. The contracting of the debt, as well as the levying of the tax, is prohibited unless authorized by the votes of the qualified electors.

It is also contended that the bonds are to be used in building a school building, a necessary municipal expense.

It has never been held anywhere, so far as we know, that the expense of the public-school system of this or any other. State is a necessary municipal expense.

Our common-school system is created in the Constitution and subject to its provisions; the cafe and control of it are left to the wisdom of the General Assembly. That body has empowered numerous municipalities to issue bonds and to tax themselves by special taxation so as to enlarge the common-school facilities provided for them by the general law of the State. But .all such measures are required to be submitted to the qualified voters for approval. The policy of the State in reference to the establishment of high schools is set forth in section 14, chapter 533, Laws 1905, which expressly provides that where the public Rinds are sufficient for the establishment of a high school the same may be established without levying a special tax, but that where the funds are insufficient for that purpose an election shall be held, and if a majority of the qualified voters vote in favor of said tax, then the same shall be imposed. This act is general in its nature and relates to the public schools of the State. The policy of the State with reference to the establishment of high schools is further seen from the provisions of chapter 820, Public Laws 1907, in which provision is made for State aid in the establishment of the same. There is nothing in the recent decision of the Court in Collie v. Commissioners, 145 N. C., 170, which sustains the idea that our public-school system is a necessary municipal expense. On the contrary, the opinion -regards the public-school system as a State insti*258tution, founded in tbe Constitution and governed and con- . trolled by tbe General Assembly. In order to reconcile clauses of tbe Constitution apparently conflicting, we beld in that case that tbe provision for four months school terms was mandatory, and that in order to give effect to'it the General Assembly could compel tbe counties of tbe State, when necessary, to disregard tbe limitation upon taxation contained in Article V, section 1.

. Tbe question presented here was decided adversely to tbe contentions of tbe defendant in Smith v. Trustees, supra, where it is beld that tbe establishment of a school district with power to issue bands for school purposes must be sanctioned by a vote of the qualified voters of tbe prescribed territory. 141 N. C., 152. And in tbe recent case of Wharton v. Greensboro, 146 N. C., 356, one of tbe.questions before the Court related to tbe validity of $80,000 in bonds issued for tbe special purpose of “equipping, altering and furnishing a school building or buildings for tbe city.” The bonds issued bad been ratified at tbe polls by a majority of the qualified voters, but it was contended that they were not to be used for necessary municipal expenses, but for a special purpose, and came .within tbe limitation prescribed for such municipal indebtedness by section.2911 of tbe Revisal.

This Court unanimously beld that tbe issuing of the $30,000 of schoolhouse bonds was “admittedly not a necessary expense,” but constituted an indebtedness contracted for a special purpose. In tbe view we take of tbe case, it is unnecessary to consider tbe other objections to the validity of tbe bonds.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the caxxse is remanded, with directions to issue tbe injunction as prayed for.

Reversed.