after stating the case: The plaintiff seeks to charge the feme defendant with the payment of the debt contracted by her, upon the ground that her business was conducted by her husband for her, and that, under the provisions . of the Revisal, sec. 2118, she thereby became a freetrader and liable for the debt as if she had been a feme sole. It is provided by the statute in question that “if any married woman shall conduct her business through her husband or any other *591agent, or if any husband or agent of any married woman shall conduct such business for her without displaying the Christian name of such married woman and the fact that she is a feme covert, by a sign placed conspicuously at the place wherein such business is conducted,” she shall be deemed and treated as a freetrader, and the property purchased and used in the 'business, as to creditors, shall be liable for the debts contracted in the course of the business by the person in charge of the same. ■
The statute was evidently passed for the purpose of preventing a married woman from conducting her business by her husband or any other agent in such .a way as to mislead her creditors by inducing them to believe that they are dealing with a person legally responsible for any debts contracted in course of the business, and concealing her identity and the fact that she is a married woman, who is protected by her coverture from their payment.
We do not think there is any evidence in this case which brings it within either the’ letter or the mischief of the statute. The plaintiff’s own witness testified that when he sold the goods he knew the husband was a drummer and in Charlotte only occasionally, and that he further knew that Mrs. Ramsey was in charge of the business, and he understood that she either owned it or owned an interest in it; that she selected the goods and gave him the order for them. In the face of this evidence it can hardly be successfully contended that the mere fact of the husband being in the store at the time of the sale and his statements to Mr. Pegram are sufficient to carry, the case to the jury for the purpose of charging Mrs. Ramsey personally .and her property with the payment of the debt. The facts being established that she was in charge of the business, to the knowledge of Mr. Pegram, agent of the plaintiff, and that she selected the goods and gave the order for them, or, in other words, that she made the contract of purchase herself, take the case entirely out of the words of the *592statute and show conclusively that it is not within the mischief intended to be suppressed. Hoav could the plaintiff be deceived as to the character of the business or as to the management of it by Mrs. Ramsey as proprietress, when its agent admits that he had full knowledge of all the material facts and was not himself misled ? Such a case as is disclosed by the proof was surely not within the contemplation of the Legislature. There is no evidence to show that the entry in the telephone book was made by the authority of Mrs. Ramsey. Indeed, what evidence there is upon that question tends strongly to show that it was not. Besides, the agent of plaintiff testified that he sold the goods upon her order, and that she was at the time in charge of the business. Upon a review of the whole case we conclude that there was not sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury within the rule established by this Court. Byrd v. Express Co., 139 N. C., 273. The motion to nonsuit should have been sustained.
Reversed.
Not controverting that the Court has placed the proper construction upon the statute, it is an anomaly that may well call for legislative consideration, if a married woman carrying on business herself is not, liable for articles purchased in its conduct, hut is liable if she has the aid or agency of her husband in buying the same articles.