There was evidence in the case sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, provided there is no error in the rulings of the court to which the defendant excepted. The policy provides as follows: “Premiums are payable at the home office in the city of New York, but at the pleasure of the company suitable persons may be authorized to receive such payments at other places, but only on the production of the company’s receipt, signed by the president or secretary and countersigned by the person receiving the payments.” Counsel argue from this provision that no receipt for a premium was admissible as evidence of its payment unless it strictly conformed to this requirement of the contract of insurance. "We do not think so. It must not be understood, though, that we consider the provision an invalid or immaterial one. Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S., 425. The jury have found upon competent evidence and under proper instructions that the premium due 8 August, 1906, was paid to the agent of the defendant, who was authorized to collect it, and that the money was remitted to the defendant and received by it. The stipulation in the policy as to the mode of *342payment and tbe form of the receipt for the premium can have no application where the money is actually received and appropriated -by the company, knowing that it was intended as a payment of the premium, as the provision was intended only to protect it against unauthorized payments to local agents or collectors. Bishop v. Life Insurance Co., 85 Mo. App., 302. It cannot be either morally or legally right for the company to insist on keeping the money paid for the premium and then deny the authority of the agent to receive it because a receipt was not given in literal compliance with the requirement of the policy. It was the agent’s fault that the “official” receipt was not delivered to the insured, and his wrong should not be imputed to the plaintiff so as to deprive her of the insurance. By receiving and retaining the money the defendant clearly waived the benefit of the stipulation as to the form of the receipt. Vance, in his work on insurance, at pp. 201, 202, says: “Usually the premium is required to be paid at the home office or to the agent in possession of a properly executed receipt. Such a stipulation must be strictly complied with, but the payment of a premium to an agent not authorized to receive it will be sufficient if the premium money actually comes to the hands of the insurer.” See, also, Joyce on Insurance, sec. 1167; Mauck v. Insurance Co., 54 Atl. Rep., 952.
The New York statute was introduced by the plaintiff and admitted by the court for the purpose of showing that notice of the maturity of premiums should have been given. But the court afterwards ruled that the law was not applicable to policies issued in this State, so that the objection to the admission of this evidence was thus eliminated.
The testimony of J. S. ITall and Charles Matthews was competent as corroborating Mrs. Matthews, who had testified as to the payment of the premiums. What she formerly said to them was clearly admissible for this purpose, and the court *343restricted the evidence within proper limits under Rule 27 of this Court. 140 N. C., 662.
We have carefully examined the case and find no error in the rulings at the trial.