after stating the case: When this case was here before (146 N. O., 230), we ordered a new trial, for the reason that, upon the pleadings and the proof tendered by *333the plaintiff and rejected by the court, the case should have been submitted to the jury to find whether there had been a mutual mistake of. the parties in drawing the mortgage of 15 March, 1900, by which goods thereafter acquired and added to the stock were omitted from the description of the property transferred, and if not, whether the defendant had given the plaintiff a separate parol mortgage upon the goods in question. We have carefully examined the evidence introduced at the last trial and have been unable to find any which sustains either of the plaintiff’s contentions. There is absolutely none tending to show that a parol mortgage was given, and that upon which the plaintiff relies to establish the alleged mistake in the mortgage of 15 March, 1900, falls far short of doing so. It is true J. E. White testified that the defendant told him the mortgage to Brown was made to secure the plaintiff, White Company, for the goods he had bought or might buy, he having used both expressions, and also that the defendant “never denied the mortgage we held in all the conversations had with him,” but this evidence does not tend to show that goods thereafter purchased were intended to be covered by the mortgage and that the description of them was omitted by the mutual mistake of the parties. The last expression, when considered in connection with what precedes and follows it, evidently referred to the plaintiff’s right to the mortgage by virtue of the transfer from Brown and not to the goods which the parties intended should be conveyed by it. If it had referred to the goods .the mere negative proof that the defendant “had not denied the mortgage,” especially when there was no proof that he was called upon to make a denial, would not tend to show that the goods now claimed by the plaintiff were intended to be conveyed and that the description of them was omitted by a mutual mistake. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how this can be so, or how there could have been any mutual mistake, as J. E. White was not present when the mortgage was given. Besides, the defendant ex*334pressly denies that the mortgage was drawn otherwise thaii contemplated by him .and Brown, and the latter certainly did not testify to any such fact. lie says in,his deposition that at the time the mortgages were executed he was acting individually and not for the J. E. White Company, and that afterwards Carroll asked him to transfer one of the mortgages to the White Company. This evidence only tends to show that Carroll intended that the mortgage so transferred to the White Company should secure not only his then existing indebtedness to the White Company, but also any indebtedness for goods he might thereafter buy from it. That is all. The proof, therefore, does not correspond with the allegation of the plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence goes to show that Carroll did not intend to give a lien on goods acquired after the date of the mortgage, for when the plaintiff applied to him for additional security he refused to give it and merely replied that he would reduce the amount of the debt by payments. The plaintiff, in order to succeed in attaching a lien to the property in controversy, was required to show by clear and convincing proof that the true intention of the parties was not expressed in the mortgage' and that the description of the property which it now claims was omitted by a mutual mistake. Warehouse Co. v. Ozment, 132 N. C., 839; Bispham’s Equity, sec. 469; Ely v. Early, 94 N. C., 8. Oral evidence would not be competent to contradict or vary the written instrument or, in other words, to show that it had a meaning not expressed in it by the parties. It is only admissible in equity to correct it, and thereby to conform it to their true intention .and agreement. Lehew v. Hewett, 138 N. C., 6. The Judge, therefore, was right when he held that there was no evidence to sustain the affirmative of the first issue, for that was virtually what he decided. Latta v. Bell, 122 N. C., 641; Baker v. Mitchell, 123 N. C., 337.
We think he erred in withdrawing the second issue from the jury. But defendant’s counsel agreed in this Court that *335judgment might be entered for tbe amount of tbe defendant’s indebtedness to tbe plaintiff. It is not distinctly stated in the record what tbe amount is. In tbe complaint the principal is fixed at $300, but no date from which interest runs is given. If the correct amount appeared we could direct judgment to be entered for it, but as it does not the case must be remanded, with directions to enter judgment- in the Superior Court for the proper amount, with interest and costs. If parties c.annot agree upon the amount it will be ascertained by a jury or otherwise as the law directs. We affirm the Judge’s ruling upon the first issue, but as there was error in withdrawing the second issue from the jury, though corrected by agreement here, the defendant will pay the costs of this Court.
Modified and Affirmed.