after stating the case: There is no repugnancy between the act of 1905, by which Elizabeth City is entitled to receive two-thirds of the road tax collected in the township by that name, and chapter 342 of the Acts of 1901, which amends section 15, chapter 596 of the Acts of 1905, by inserting therein the words “and the streets of Elizabeth City” after the word “county,” and striking out the proviso in that section, so that it will now read: “That all moneys raised in the county shall constitute a general fund for the common good of the roads of the county and the streets of Elizabeth City.” The act of 1907 can only have effect prospectively, as the intention that it shall so operate is clearly manifested by the Legislature in the phraseology used to express it. It is an elementary rule of construction that a statute will not be declared to be retroactive unless it was clearly intended so to be, and especially where such a construction would take away rights acquired under a former law, even though the Legislature would have the constitutional power thus to divest them. State v. Littlefield, 93 N. C., 614. It is a sound general principle that no statute takes effect as of a time prior to its ratification or has effect by any fiction or relation before it was actually passed, unless it is so declared in the statute, either expressly or by clear implication. Even remedial statutes are sometimes declared prospective in their operation and are not applied retrospectively, unless a contrary intent in some w.ay appears. Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, p. 162, note 9. In Black’s Interpretation of Laws, p. 250, Ave find the principle stated as folloAvs: “Courts will not give to a laAv a retrospective operation, even where they might do so without isolation of the Constitution, unless the intention of the Legislature is clearly expressed in favor of such retrospective, operation. Except in the case of remedial statutes and those which relate to procedure in the courts, it is a general rule that acts of the Legislature will not be so construed as to make them operate retrospectively unless the Legislature has *543explicitly declared its intention that they should so operate, or unless such intention appears by necessary implication from the nature and words of the act so clearly as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt on the subject.” In 1 Desty on Taxation, 104 and 105, the rule is declared to be that statutes are not construed retrospectively: “Presumptively, tax laws are to have a prospective operation only, and the remedies they provide for collection will not be applied to taxes previously laid, unless an intent that they shall be is clearly manifested. Provisions in a statute which make radical changes in the rights of parties should be treated as prospective.”
Under the principle established by the authorities for the construction of statutes, which we have just stated, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether Elizabeth City had any vested right to the fund in controversy which could not be taken away by subsequent legislation. It is quite sufficient, for the purpose of deciding this case, that, by applying that principle to the facts as set forth in the record, the act of 1907 can only have a prospective operation, as it refers very clearly to “money” thereafter “raised” by taxation, and not to the taxes which had been previously levied for road purposes. We can discover no intent on the part of the Legislature to give the act of 1907 a retrospective effect, so as to deprive the plaintiff of its share of the fund in dispute. The other amendments of the act of 1907, and even the amendment of section 15, standing alone, convince us that the contrary was the real purpose of the Legislature. We attach no importance to the issues and verdict in forming our conclusion, but decide the case upon the admitted facts and a consideration of the act of 1905 as amended by the act of 1907. It follows that there was no error in the judgment of the court.
Affirmed.