after stating the facts: The statute (Eevisal, sec. 1388) provides “that the board shall cause to be posted at the courthouse, within five days after each regular December meeting and for at least four successive weeks,” certain statements fully set forth in the statute. It being conceded that the term of the board of which defendant was a member expired on the first Monday of December, 1904, the question is presented, whether the failure to publish the statement required by the statute within five days after the expiration *428of bis term subjects tbe defendant to the penalty. It would seem to be too clear for discussion that, after the expiration of the term of the Board of Commissioners, the, members thereof cease to constitute the corporate entity known as “The Board of Commissioners.” Their corporate capacity came to an end at the expiration of their term, and the corporation known as “The Board of Commissioners” is composed of their successors. How, then, is it possible for the defendant to be liable for the penalty for failing to discharge a duty imposed upon the Board of Commissioners after he ceases to he a member of such board ? Is it not manifest that the duty to publish a statement is imposed upon the board in its corporate capacity — that is, upon those persons who constitute the board during the five days after the regular December meeting? The plaintiff relies upon the case of Roberts v. Southern Pines, 125 N. C., 172. It will be observed that the facts in that case are different from those presented upon this record. The statute there required the Board of Town Commissioners to publish annually — fixing no time subsequent to any monthly meeting — a statement of the amount expended by them. Hence, there was no reason why, at the last meeting-on the first Monday in May, they should npt have made the publication, and their failure to do so could not be thereby shifted to their successors; whereas the statute under which defendant is sued prescribes that they shall have five days after the regular December meeting within which to publish the statement. The distinction between the two cases is obvious, It is suggested that the purpose of the Legislature was to require each board to make publication of its own official acts in connection with the public revenues. However that may be, we have no power to read into the statute any other meaning than that which is clearly ascertained from its language. This being a penal statute, it is elementary that it must be construed strictly, or, at least, so construed as to give effect to all of its terms, and not to extend them by implica*429tion or suggestions as to tbe legislative intention. Tbe policy of tbe law is to require tbe publication of tbe receipts and disbursements of tbe public revenues. Tbis is secured by imposing tbe duty upon tbe incoming board, to whom tbe record made by tbeir predecessors is turned over, as effectually as upon tbe outgoing board, wbo bave no further control of tbe records, or duties 'in connection therewith. It may be suggested that tbe policy of tbe law would be best met by requiring a new board to make tbe publication, as its members could bave no possible motive for suppressing any facts or making other than a truthful statement. However tbis may be, tbe language of tbe act is perfectly plain, that tbe board shall make its statement “within five days after each regular December meeting.” Tbis can only be done by tbe board which shall be in existence during tbe time within which tbe statement is to be published.
We are of tbe opinion that the defendant was entitled to bave his motion allowed, and in refusing to do so there was
Error.