after stating the case: This case is governed by the principles stated in Hough v. Railway, 144 N. C., 692. *342The only difference between the two cases is to be found in the fact that the complaint in this case states with clearness and precision a cause of action against the defendants for a joint tort, and specifically alleges in what the negligence which caused the death of the intestate consists. A plaintiff, as we decided in that case, may sue tort feasors jointly or severally, at his election, and if he elects to sue them jointly, he has the right to have the case tried as for a joint tort, and no separable controversy is presented within the meaning of the removal act. In Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S., 41, the Court said: “There is here, according to the complaint, but a single cause of action, and that is the alleged malicious prosecution of the plaintiffs by all the defendants, acting in concert. The cause of action is several as well as joint, and the plaintiffs might have sated each defendant separately or all jointly. It was for the plaintiffs to elect which course to pursue. They did elect to proceed against all jointly, and to this the defendants are not permitted to object. The fact that a judgment in the action may be rendered against a part of the defendants only does not divide a joint action in tort into separate parts any more than it does a joint action on contract.” The cases sustaining this view are all cited in Hough v. Railway, supra, and it is not necessary to prolong the discussion of the question. The order of his Honor was made on 24 April, 1907, and the decision in Hough v. Railway was not published until 27 May, 1907. The court did not, therefore, have that case before it when the order in this case was made. We then decided that a case of joint tort was not removable.
Reversed.