The evidence tends to prove that the plaintiff Julia A. Davis inherited the land described in the complaint from her father. She is the widow of M. M. Davis. She and her husband had but one child, a son, by name of Eugene O. Davis. Early in life, when this son was about seventeen *164or eighteen years of age, he developed tuberculosis and died. While in this diseased condition and enfeebled by the ravages of his fatal malady, the plaintiff and her husband, M. M. Davis, joined in a deed purporting to convey plaintiff’s land to said son, who, within a few months thereafter, died. The father, M. M. Davis, also died within two years of the death of his son.
Treating the deed from his mother and father to the son as a conveyance of the fee, the land inherited by plaintiff from her father passed to the son absolutely, and, upon the demise of the son, became, by descent and under the statute, the land of her father. Upon the death of M. M. Davis the land went, in the absence of direct heirs, to the collateral heirs of the said M. M. Davis, who are the defendants in this action, subject to the dower interest of the widow, who is the plaintiff.
No valuable consideration whatever was ever paid by Eugene 0. Davis, or by anyone for him, or by anyone at all, and the plaintiff never received anything for the land. In her complaint the plaintiff alleges, in substance, that the so-called execution of the deed by her was procured by the force and fear of her husband, with intent, as it is inferred, of becoming the absolute owner of his wife’s land upon the expected death of the son. She alleges that she was never privily examined touching her voluntary consent to the execution of the deed, and that the deed is void, but that the deed is a cloud upon her better title, and asks relief that the Court remove the same. There was evidence offered by plaintiff tending to prove that her husband and herself acknowledged the signing of the deed before a justice of the peace; that her husband was present during the entire ceremony; that the justice did not examine her at all as to her voluntary assent, and that, in fact, no privy examination whatever was taken, either in her husband’s presence or out of it.
Although the language of the first issue would seem to indicate that the case turned upon the mere presence of the hus*165band at tbe ceremony of privy examination, yet sucb is not tbe fact. Tbe charge of tbe Court shows plainly that it turned upon tbe sole question as to whether any examination at all was taken. Tbe defendants requested tbe Court to charge: “(1) That there is no evidence in this case that Eugene Davis, tbe grantee in tbe deed of 13 May, 1904, offered in evidence, bad at any time any knowledge or notice of tbe alleged defect -in said deed to him. Tbe plaintiffs, in no aspect of tbe case, can recover. (2) That tbe certificate of tbe justice taking tbe private examination of'a married woman is a judicial act, and ought to stand, unless tbe evidence offered to set it aside is full and convincing.” Tbe Court refused to give tbe first instruction, but gave tbe second, to the effect that tbe proof should be clear, strong and convincing. Tbe Court further charged tbe jury that they should be fully satisfied, by strong, clear and convincing proof, that there was no private examination taken.
Tbe presence and undue influence of tbe husband at tbe ceremony of privy examination would not vitiate a certificate in all respects regular, unless tbe grantee bad notice of it, and tbe burden would be upon plaintiffs to show sucb notice. Be-visal, sec. 956. But that is not tbe theory upon which this case was tried. Tbe charge of tbe Court made tbe case turn upon tbe contention as to whether any sucb ceremony ever took place at all, and not what occurred at it. Tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff herself is to-the effect that she was never, at that or any other time, examined as to her voluntary execution of said deed. Tbe cases cited by tbe learned counsel for tbe defendants undoubtedly support their contention, that tbe presence and undue influence of tbe husband will not avoid tbe legal effect of tbe certificate of privy examination made by one qualified to také it, unless tbe grantee is fixed with notice of it. Riggan v. Sledge, 116 N. C., 92; Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C., 575. But we have held at this term that, while tbe certificate, if regular on its face, precludes all in*166quiry into tbe fraud or falsehood in the faclvm of the privy examination, unless the grantee is fixed with knowledge thereof, yet it is open to the feme covert to show, if she can, that, in fact, no examination whatever was taken. Lumber Co. v. Leonard, at this term. The theory upon which this case was tried, and the manner in which it was presented to the jury by the Court, brings it within that ruling. ITis Honor very properly placed the burden on plaintiff to establish her contention by clear, cogent and convincing proof.
It may be that' the jurors were unduly influenced by the evident wrong which had been perpetrated on plaintiff by her husband, but we cannot correct that. We repeat again what we said in substance in Lumber Co. v. Leonard, supra: The Judges of the Superior Court should be extremely careful, in cases of this kind, to explain to the jury that the solemn acts of judicial officers are not to be lightly set aside, as titles to land depend upon the validity of their certificates, and ilever upon a mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon clear, strong and convincing proof. Unless, in their opinion, the proof measures fully up to this high standard, we think the trial Judge should not hesitate to set aside a verdict which destroys the legal effect of such an important judicial act.
No Error.