after stating the case: We will not discuss the question raised in the argument before us, whether it was the duty of defendant to have had a switch engine instead of a road engine for the use of the crew on its train, as it is not necessary to a decision of the case.
Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant and specified different acts or omissions as constituting the negligence. Each act or omission, so alleged, was not pleaded nor intended to be treated as the basis of a separate and distinct cause of action, but as singly, or in connection with the others, tending to establish the one cause of action for the negligence which resulted in his injury. When the court intimated that it would withdraw a portion of plaintiff’s evidence from the jury, it acted prematurely, for the case was not being submitted to the jury at the time and the ruling did not extend to the entire cause of action, as would be the case with a judgment sustaining a motion to nonsuit or to dismiss. The ruling at that time was calculated to embarrass and to handicap plaintiff in the development of his case and necessarily to prejudice him. But we will not further discuss this matter, nor will we even refer to the legal merits of the case, so far as presented by the pleadings and evidence, when it was abruptly brought to a close by the intimation of the court. Nor is it necessary to decide, as will hereafter appear, whether plaintiff proceeded properly when he elected to be nonsuited, and appealed. It is common practice for a plaintiff to submit to an involuntary nonsuit, which he is driven or compelled to take, reserving leave to move afterwards to set the same aside, with a view *134not to abandon the prosecution of the suit, but to further prosecute it by appeal, in order to test the correctness of - a ruling of the court which may otherwise be fatal to bis case; and the practice is a useful one when restricted within its proper limits. Mobley v. Watts, 98 N. C., 284; Hickory v. Railroad, 138 N. C., 311; Hedrick v. Pratt, 94 N. C., 101. In order to avoid appeals based upon trivial interlocutory decisions, the right thus to proceed has been said to apply ordinarily only to cases where the ruling of the court strikes at the root of the case and precludes a recovery by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s right to take the course he did was challenged in this court, because the ruling did not cover-the whole case, but left him ground upon which a recovery could 'be had. But we do not find it necessary to resort to said rule of practice in order to dispose of this appeal, and we do not therefore decide that it warranted or did not warrant the action of plaintiff. In Davis v. Dly, 100 N. C., 283, plaintiff sought by the allegations of his complaint to have a contract corrected in certain respects. After the jury were empan-neled and the pleadings read, the court intimated that he was not entitled to the equity of correction, but to that of rescission. He excepted, submitted to a nonsuit and appealed. It was held that the nonsuit was unnecessary at that stage of the trial, and the appeal therefore could not be entertained. But notwithstanding this decision, the court, referring to the ground upon which it had based the ruling and in disposing of the case, said: “Eor these reasons we should dismiss the appeal and allow the cause to proceed in the court below, but that such would not be the result in this case because of the nonsuit which ends the action, and this action was in deference to the intimated ruling. We therefore remand the cause that the nonsuit may be set aside and the action proceed.”
Pursuing the course taken in that case, we remand the *135cause witb directions to set aside tbe nonsuit and thereafter to proceed in the same according to the law and the course and practice of the court.
New Trial.