State v. McDonald, 14 N.C. 468, 3 Dev. 468 (1832)

Dec. 1832 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

14 N.C. 468, 3 Dev. 468

The State v. Randal McDonald, et al.

A search warrant can be-granted only to seize stolen goods, and when one recited, that A had enticed the negroes of B to leave him, and that he was harboring them, and commanded the officer to seize them: It was held that the justice had no authority to issue it, and that it did not justify the officer.

The defendants were indicted for a forcible trespass in entering the dwelling house of one Philip Brooks and » • carrying away several slaves. On the last circuit at Moore, before his Honor Judge Damee, the jury returned the following special verdict: °

‘‘That Randal McDonald, one of the defendants, was a constable of Moore county on the 29th day of August, 1831 — ’that on that day D. M. another of the defendants, gave information upon oath, of the facts stated in the warrant herein after set forth, to TV. B. a justice of the peace for the county aforesaid, who thereupon issued the same in the words and figures following: To any lawful officer, &c. whereas complaint has been made on oath before me, &c. by I). M. that a certain Philip Brooks, of &c. has tempted and persuaded liis negroes, <kc. to leave him, the said D. M. and now has the same concealed in his possession for the purpose of harboring the same, or conveying them out of the state — These are therefore to command you, &c. to search the possessions of the said P. B. and take the said negroes, if they arc found, 'together with the said Brooks before me or some other &c. That the said warrant was delivered to the said Randal McDonald to he executed, who thereupon, accompanied by the other defendants, who were summoned by the constable to aid in the execution of it, proceeded to the farm of the said P. B. and the defendants then, in execution of the warrant, took into their possession some of the ne-groes above mentioned, who were laboring upon the farm of the said P. !1. and in his service — that the defendants afterwards proceeded to the dwelling-isouse of the said P. B. and after the constable had demanded admittance into the house, and had beers refused, with force and violence broke open the door thereof, asid took into their possession others of the negroes abovementioned, who were then in the house, and carried them away. The jury further find that the said It. M. was entitled to the services of the above mentioned negroes, and that they were enticed and persuaded by the said P. B. to leave his possessions but that the said P. B. in good faith, claimed to be the lawful owner of them, and that lie acquired possession in assertion of his supposed title, and that the said negroes came to his house before day light on the morning of the said 29th of April, 1831. The jury be-inS ignorant, &c. Upon this verdict bis Honor gave judgment for the defendants, and Mr. Solicitor Troy ap-pea]e(K

The Attorney- General for the State.

No counsel appeared on the other side.

Daniel, Judge,

after stating the verdict as above, proceeded:

Since hearing the arguments here, and examining the authorities cited, I am satisfied that the judgment which I gave in the court below, was erroneous.

The question now to be determined is, whether the defendant McDonald, who was a constable, and the other defendants who were summoned by him, to aid him, can justify under the warrant mentioned in the case.

At common law, a lawful warrant from a justice who has jurisdiction of the cause, justifies the officer who executes it, though it be irregularly issued ; but it is otherwise, when the justice who issues the warrant has not jurisdiction of the cause, (1 Chitty C. L. 69, Hawk P. C. Bk. 2 c. 13 s. 10. Cum. Dig. imprisonment 8, 9.) Warrants to search for stolen goods, are authorised by the principles of the common law. Without them, says Lord Hale. felons would frequently escape detection, (2 Hale 113.) A search warrant in this state, is to be granted only where a larceny is charged to have been committed. It is not to he granted without oath made before the justice, that a felony has been committed, and that the party complaining has probable caúselo suspect that the stolen goods are in such a place, and he should show his reasons for the suspicion, (2 Hale 113, 150, Chitty Crim. Law. 65.) The warrant then should be directed to a constable or public officer, and not to a private person. It is fit that the party complaining should be present, and assisting, because he will he able to identify the property which he has lost, (l Hale 150.)

The justice who issued the warrant in this case, had jurisdiction to issue a warrant to search for stolon goods, and whether the facts set forth in the affidavit of the a])-plicant for the warrant, constituted a I arceny of the goods, was for his determination. If he had issued a Warrant,. w hicli professed to be an authority for the officer.to search some particular place for stolen property, then the officer would have been justified in acting under such a warrant, although in truth and fact, no larceny liad been committed. The justice is to judge and determine upon the questions of law, arising from the facts disclosed in the affidavit of the person making the application. The constable being a ministerial officer, must execute the warrant, and cannot decide whether it should have been issued on such an affidavit or not. I mean that the officer must execute, if the case was one which appeared by the warrant to be professedly within the jurisdiction of the justice. But it seems clear that a constable cannot justify an arrest, by force of a warrant from a justice,' which expressly appears on the face of it, to be for an of-fence of vdiich he has no jurisdiction, (2 Hawk P. C. 130 Shergold v. Holloway, Strange 1002.) The offence set forth on the face of this warrant, expressly appears to be of a description which a justice could not issue a search-warrant to remedy. The offence charged against the defendant, in the warrant, is that he “ tempted and persuaded his negroes, Tempi/, &c. to leave him, the said Daniel McNielL.” The offence was not a larceny, it was only made a misdemeanor by the act of 1821, (T«y. liev. c. 1120.) The justice did not intend, neither did his warrant profess to have been issued, to search for stolen property. In issuing such a warrant, ho exceeded his jurisdiction, therefore it was void ; and the officer was bound to know that it was void, and would be no justification to him if he executed it. The officer is not bound to know, whether a'warrant, which upon its face was professedly -within the iurisdic- „ , ,, _ tion oí a justice, liad been issued regularly or not. But if from what is stated on the face of the warrant, it appear that the justice has exceeded his jurisdiction, the officer is bound to know that such a warrant is void and will be no justification for his acting under it j and if he executes it, he does so at his peril. The judgment in the Superior Court must be reversed.

An officer can "ot decltle wlie; ther a warrant isissued proper-at’iu^periWe-termine whether of the matter.

Pur Curiam. — Judgment reversed.