Jones v. Sasser, 14 N.C. 378, 3 Dev. 378 (1832)

Dec. 1832 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

14 N.C. 378, 3 Dev. 378

Arthur Jones v. Lewis Sasser.

Notwithstanding tlie act of 1806 (Rev. c. 701,) requires deeds ot gift for slaves to be registered within one year o,f their date, yet if registered within the time prescribed by the aots allowing longer time for that purpose, they are valid.

Detinue, for a slave, tried on the last circuit, at Wayne, before D antee, Judge. Plea — JVbtt delineh A number of points were intended to be presented by the case certified with the record j none of which it is necessary to state, except the following: The plaintiff claimed the slave in dispute under a deed of gift from his father, Jirthur Jones sen. dated April 5th, 1827, which was not registered until February 20th, 1830. The defendant claimed under a deed from the same person, dated August 5th, 1829, which was registered January 10th, 1830_-His Honor instructed the jury, that as the plaintiff claimed under a deed of gift, no title passed by it until it wast registered, and until that took place, that the title remained in his father ; that if the latter retained the possession until the deed of August 1829.- the execution of that deed, and its prior registration, gave the defendant title, which would not be divested by the subsequent registration of the deed to the plaintiff.

A verdict, was returned for the. defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

The case of approved,

J. H. Bryan anti Mordecai, for the plaintiff.

Gaston and If. G. Slaithj, contra.

Ruffin, Judge.

By the act of 1806, (JR., e. 701,) no gift of slaves is good or available, unless made in writing. “Neither,” the act continues, “ shall such gift be valid, “ unless the writing shall be proven or acknowledged, “ and registered within one year after the execution “thereof.” These words seem to denote a purpose in the legislature, then to make the registry acts effectual, at least, in reference to the gift of slaves. Perhaps no purpose could be more politic ; for registration is now scarcely of any use, except as a means of preserving the instrument for the benefit of the person claiming under it, in case of the loss of the original, as the party may keep the deed in his pocket as long as he pleases, and place it on the register’s books only when it becomes his interest to defeat some claimant, who has, ignorant of his deed, acquired a right. Probably these strong reasons induced the judge in the court below, to lay down the rule he did. But they are reasons, which address themselves rather to the discretion of the legislature, than to ours. The legislature has certainly the power to enlarge the time for registration, and to pronounce its effect, and if to them it seem good, the courts must execute their will. From time to time, acts giving further time for registration have been passed ; and in each, deeds of gift, and indeed all conveyances, except mortgages and deeds of trust, are expressly included ; and it is enacted, that they shall be as good and valid, as if they liad been proven and registered within the time before allowed by law. Such are the words of the acts of 1827, c. 30, and 1829, c. 26, which embrace the case now before us. Acts of this character, have always received a literal construction ; in fact, they are susccpti ble of none other. The only exception is the case of Stales v. Few cl, (3 Hawks. 18.) in which there was an hiatus of one year between the extending acts °f 1818 and 1821, and during the interval, rights vested in other persons. The court thought the last act was not intended to defeat such vested rights. But in every other case, deeds registered at ever so remote a period, have been held, by force of the new registry acts, to be as operative as if registered within the periods prescribed by the acts 1715 or 1806, or any other general statute. Here there was no interval.

Pee Curiam. — Judgment aefirmed.