after stating tbe case: On the facts presented for our consideration, the right of the plaintiff to the relief demanded, depends on whether the plaintiff and defendant are now husband and wife. Skittletharpe v. Skittletharpe, 130 N. C., 72. It will be noted that the plaintiff in her reply assails the validity of the North Dakota decree, first for lack of jurisdiction, and second, for that the same was obtained by fraud. and duress. Eut no such impeaching allegations are made against the proceedings and decree of the court of Massachusetts. This being true, we are of opinion that the latter decree conclusively determines that the plaintiff and defendant are no longer husband and wife, and that the plaintiff has therefore no right to further support from the defendant.
It is accepted doctrine that so far as the subject matter of the controversy is concerned, actions for divorce deal with the status of the parties, and that jurisdiction in such actions is dependent upon the domicile of the parties at the time the decrees are rendered. Where neither party has a domicile in the State of the forum, such court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the controversy, a decree of divorce is void, though both.parties may have appeared, and voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
Where the plaintiff only is domiciled in the State of the forum, and has obtained a decree of divorce for a cause recognized as valid in such State, after constructive service of process on the defendant, according to the course and practice of the court, there has heretofore been diversity of opinion as to the extent and binding force of such a decree in other jurisdictions. North Carolina has heretofore held against the validity of such a decree by the courts of other States, as affecting the status of her own citizens. The better doctrine, however, now seems to be that where the domicile of the plaintiff has been acquired in good faith, and not in fraud or violation of some law of a former domicile, a divorce *410of this kind should be recognized as binding everywhere— certainly within the jurisdiction of the United States or any one of them. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S., 155; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14.
The case of Atherton v. Atherton does not establish the proposition here stated, on precisely similar facts to the case before us, or it would be controlling; but the general tenor of the decision would seem to favor this conclusion.
Where, however, the action is instituted and the decree obtained in the State of the plaintiff’s domicile, and the defendant has been served with process within the jurisdiction of the forum, or has voluntarily appeared and answered, all the decisions are agreed that a decree in such case is valid both in rem and in personam, and will bind and conclude the parties everywhere. Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y., 415; Arrington v. Arrington, 102 N. C., 491. The proceedings and decree of the court of Massachusetts are of the latter character.
It is admitted or established that the plaintiff in that suit, as she is in this, was at the time, and still is, resident and domiciled in the State of Massachusetts. Her libel was for the purpose of obtaining an absolute divorce from the defendant. He appeared and answered, and set up the proceedings and decree of the North Dakota court in bar of the plaintiff’s demand. The Massachusetts court, after full hearing, dismissed the libel on the ground that the North Dakota decree was valid, and that the status of the parties was not that of husband and wife.
There is no allegation or claim that the court which rendered this decree is without jurisdiction, or that the same was obtained by fraud. The investigation and decree necessarily passed upon and determined the very questions involved here. The court had jurisdiction both of the cause- and the parties, and the conclusion is not open to further investigation.
*411' True, tbe case on appeal states that the plaintiff was ready to produce testimony that the defendant never had any domicile in North Dakota, and that such court was without jurisdiction, and that the decree of the Dakota court was.obtained by fraud and duress. The answer is that the validity of the divorce has been established by a decree of a competent court, having full jurisdiction in the cause, where the very questions she now seeks to raise, had been, or could have been, passed upon and determined, and that the plaintiff is thereby estopped from further question concerning them. Jenkins v. Johnston, 51 N. C., 149; Tuttle v. Harrill, 85 N. C., 456; McElwee v. Blackwell, 101 N. C., 192; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass., 39; Hood v. Hood, 110 Mass., 463; Brady v. Brady, 160 Mass., 258; Cromwell v. County Sac., 94 U. S., 351.
It is suggested that the decree of the Massachusetts court is a consent decree, and for that reason is not binding or conclusive between the parties in actions of this character. The question, however, does not arise on this record, for we are clearly of opinion that this is not a decree by consent. The entire record discloses that the case was conducted throughout as an adversary proceeding, and judgment was entered after full and due inquiry into the facts. Our decision of the cause is in accord with the general equities of the case, as indicated by the course of events and the conduct and present status of the parties.
The plaintiff having appeared and answered, in the suit in North Dakota, receives $10,000 awarded her in that case for the care and custody of her minor child. After a delay of six and a half years, she institutes her own suit for divorce in Massachusetts, which is determined against her, and in which she is awarded thousand dollars by way of allowance. Again, after considerable delay, in apparent acquiescence, she brings this suit, seeking further allowance for support. The defendant, in the meanwhile, in reliance on *412tbe decrees of two courts — one of them certainly having full jurisdiction of both cause and parties — has married another woman, and had a child born to him by this marriage.
Apart from the estoppel by record on the principal question, there is strong authority for holding that the plaintiff is estopped by conduct in pais from asserting any further claim for pecuniary allowance against the defendant. Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq., 60; Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa, 273; Bailey v. Bailey, 44 Pa. St., 274. There should be an end to this litigation. The defendant may well invoke .for his protection the maxim, Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.
We hold that there was no error in the ruling of the court below.
No Error.