after stating the facts: The court is of opinion that J. M. Campbell, the claimant, is estopped from asserting any lien or incumbrance against the property sold by the receiver to Merrick and Hewitt, and known as the “Ashe-ville Cigarette Factory,” and, on the admissions in the pleadings and the facts found by the referee, the deed of trust should be cancelled of record and the judgment below affirmed.
It appears that the property was owned by the Asheville Tobacco Works, and on May 20, 1891, this corporation executed the deed of trust in question to George S. Powell, trustee, to secure a debt of $1,000 in favor of J. M- Campbell, —-Campbell being at the time secretary and treasurer of the tobacco works; that on March 23, 1892, the tobacco works for valuable consideration conveyed this property, with all its other property, to a new corporation, the Asheville Cigarette Company; that the deed was executed for the tobacco works by the claimant, Campbell, who had then become its president, and contained full covenants of warranty, and also a covenant that the same was free from any and all in-cumbrances; that on February 10, 1893, the Cigarette Company made a deed of trust for the property in question to L. P. McLeod, as trustee, to secure a debt due to the defendant bank; that the deed was made with the knowledge and consent of the claimant, Campbell, who was then a di*471rector in this company; that on March 5, 1895, McLeod sold the property under the deed and the same was bought by the bank and title made. Erom that time to the sale by the receiver in December, 1902, the referee finds that the bank has paid the taxes on the property, and has been in the actual continuous and notorious possession of the same, receiving the rents and profits, claiming and using the same as absolute owner under a deed in fee simple and with the knowledge of Campbell and the trustee, Powell.
In the opinion of the court, these facts present every element of an equitable estoppel against the assertion of any lien'or incumbrance on the property in favor of the claimant, Campbell. He conveys the title to the Cigarette Company, for full value, by deed containing a covenant that the same is free from any and all incumbrances. True, this was a conveyance by the corporation and therefore is not an estoppel by deed against Campbell as an individual. But he signed the deed for the company as its president, and to that extent he was an actor in the matter, and this covenant that the property is free from incumbrances amounts to a representation by him that this is true. Again, when a director of the Cigarette Company, he knowingly permits the defendant bank to advance money and take a lien on the property evidently to its full value, presumably greater, as the bank was compelled to buy in the property on its debt. And after the bank purchased and took the title, it continued to occupy and claim the same as owner under its deed for more than seven years and until the same was sold by the receiver in December, 1902; and during this entire time there was no assertion of any lien on the part of Campbell, nor any mention of it, so far as the evidence discloses. True, the occupation and conduct after the purchase are not evidence on the estoppel, but these facts are very strong testimony confirming the view taken by the court that Campbell throughout dealt with the property as if he had no lien upon it, and that he *472permitted and induced others to advance and invest their money in and upon it, believing and having every right to believe that the same was free from incumbrances. Under the circumstances of this case, he should not be heard now to set up such claim to their prejudice.
It is familiar learning that “where one knowingly suffers another in his presence to purchase property in which he has a claim or title, which he wilfully conceals, he will be deemed under such circumstances to have waived his claim, and will not afterwards be permitted to assert it against a purchaser.” Numerous decisions of our own court uphold and apply this doctrine. Gill v. Denton, 71 N. C., 341; Morris v. Herndon, 113 N. C., 236; Shattuck v. Cauley, 119 N. C., 295; Bassett v. Noseworthy, II White & Tudor, par. 1, p. 29, 30.
The decision below is affirmed on the ground that the claimant is estopped from asserting any lien or incumbrance on the property, and that the same should be cancelled of record as a cloud on the title.
It seems that the defendant bank had a claim against Campbell to the amount of $700 or $800, .and the referee declared, as one of his conclusions of law, that the debt was a valid offset against the claim of Campbell, and should be applied in reduction of such claim. Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of this ruling, it will suffice to say that the same was made by the referee and confirmed by the judge, and no exception appears in the record which gives this court the right to disturb it. The effect therefore is that this debt of the bank against the claimant; Campbell, is extinguished and must be so considered. Judgment below
Affirmed.
Appeal by Receives.
The court is unable to perceive how the rights of the receiver were in any way prejudiced by the judgment appealed from, and such judgment is therefore
Affirmed.