after stating the facts. We were not favored with a brief or argument in behalf of the defendant and are not quite sure we understand upon what ground his Honor excluded the abstracts of grants offered by the plaintiff. They appear to be in the usual form and duly certified. The only statement in the record is that in the opinion of the Court they were not grants and not sufficient to take title out of the State. The abstracts are in exactly the same form as the one which was held by this Court to be competent in McLenan v. Chisholm, 64 N. C., 323. Pearson, C. J., says: “From the abstract it appears with the requisite certainty that Sampson Williams was the grantee, Governor Martin the grantor and three hundred acres of land therein described the subject of the grant, and that a grant was executed May 24, 1773. This is settled.” With the change of names, etc., the language is strictly appropriate to the case before us. Nash, J., in Clarke v. Diggs, 28 N. C., 159, says that the Legislature by an act passed in 1748 made the abstracts entered in the office of Lord Granville, or exemplifications of them, duly proven evidence as if the originals were produced. “The paper offered in evidence is an abstract containing the courses and distances of the lines, and the date and is signed by the Governor of the Colony and the Secretary of State has certified that it is a true copy of the record of the grant. We believe-that the practice has been uniform to record ab'stracts, and though the act is not *558brought forward in the Revised Statutes, we are of the opinion that the act merely recognized the rule of the common law, and by the latter the copy was evidence.” Candler v. Lunsford, 20 N. C., 142. The plaintiff’s exception must be sustained. It was not necessary for plaintiff to connect his title with that of Waters’. The plaintiff if permitted to show title out of the State was entitled to show, if he could, a chain of title connecting himself with the grantor, or if unable to do this, to build up title in himself by any of the ways pointed out in Motley v. Griffin, 104 N. C., 112. After the rejection of the grants, plaintiff undertook to show title out of the State by showing thirty years’ possession or twenty years under color of title. Eor the latter purpose, it was necessary that he locate the land within the boundaries of his deed. lie encountered difficulty in this effort because his deed called for a line beginning at a stake on Colly. Unless there was some call in the deed for a natural object, or something equivalent thereto, he could not locate the land. Archibald v. Davis, 50 N. C., 322. There is, however, a call for a “light-wood stump on the run of Colly.” If he could locate this stump to the satisfaction of the jury,' there was no reason why by reversing the calls, the jury may not have ascertained and located the lines back to the beginning and thence with the swamp to the stump. Dobson v. Finley, 53 N. C., 495. His Honor correctly so charged the jury. Eor the purpose of locating the stump and aiding the jury in locating the lines therefrom, the proposed testimony-of Barnhill was competent, and, if accepted by the jury, very valuable. To show by the chain-bearer at a survey made a year before the execution of the deed what lines were run and marked around the locus in quo was most material. The plaintiff’s several exceptions in this respect, from two to five inclusive, must be sustained. We have examined *559witb care the entire record. There are quite a number of exceptions. As the case goes back for a new trial, we deem it best not to discuss them, as they may not arise again. It may be that in the light of the finding of the jury the rejection of the grants did not injuriously affect the plaintiff; we cannot tell how this is. There must be a new trial.
New Trial.