Miller v. State, 134 N.C. 270 (1904)

March 1, 1904 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

134 N.C. 270

MILLER v. STATE.

(Filed March 1, 1904).

1. JURISDICTION — Supreme Court — Costs—Const. N. C., Art. IV, seo. 9.

The supreme court has not original jurisdiction of an action against the state by a clerk of the superior court for fees in an action instituted by the state and for which it has been adjudged liable.

2. JURISDICTION — Supreme Court — Costs.

The supreme court has not original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state in eases in which no question of law is involved.

Oojigiwal PROoeexdings in tiie Supreme Court by Mollie A. Miller, administratrix of Festus Miller, against the State.

Busbee & Busbee, Womack & Hayes, for tbe plaintiff.

Robert D. Gilmer, Attorney-General, for tbe State,

Montgomery, J.

Under tbe terms and provisions of chapter 119 of tbe Public Laws of 1887, several hundred persons made entries of certain oyster lands subjected to entry by that act and received grants therefor. By the provisions ■of chapter 287 of the Public Laws of 1893, the Solicitor 'of the First Judicial District was directed to institute proceedings in ejectment against such persons as had received grants for natural oyster or clam beds; and under the directions of that statute the Solicitor commenced suit against six hundred and ninety-four of those persons who had received grants under the provisions of the act of 1887. One of the suits was tried and the plaintiff’s action was not sustained, and nonsuits were taken in all of the other actions. In the- case of Blount v. Simmons, 119 N. C., 50, this Court held that the State, under section 536 of The Code, was liable for the costs. Afterwards the plaintiff in this action, in a certain judgment rendered in the Superior Court of P’amlico County against the State for the sum of $4,096.60 on account of fees due the officers in the above-mentioned actions, was adjudged entitled to $3,872.20 thereof for fees due to Festus Miller, Clerk of the Superior Court of Pamlico County, her intestate. Before that judgment was rendered Festus Miller, the plaintiff’s intestate, received an Auditor’s warrant to the amount of $4,851.41 for fees dire him in these cases, but the Treasurer declined to pay the same or any part of it. The plaintiff’s intestate, at the session of the General Assembly of 1899, presented her claim against the State for these fees and the matter received a full and careful investi.gation of that body. The whole proceedings were laid before this Court, and if this was a case where.the Court had jurisdiction under Article IY, section 9, of the State Constitution, we could not conscientiously recommend to the General Assembly a settlement of this matter different from the ■one which was made. We are of the opinion, however, that we have no jurisdiction in the premises. In the first place, the demand of the plaintiff is not such a claim against the .State as is in contemplation of Article IY, section 9, of the Constitution. In the case of Blount v. Summons, 119 N. C., 50, this Court said: “The costs in this case are not strictly a claim against the State as contemplated by Article IV, section 9, but only an incident- of an action by the State for which its agent has assumed that it will be liable to the same extent as private persons.” In the next place, there is no question of law involved in this matter. Only matters of fact were in dispute, and they have been passed upon by the General Assembly; and where such a condition of things exist we are not called upon to recommend any line of conduct to the legislative body In the case of Reynolds v. State, 64 N. C., 460, this Court said:r “We are fully satisfied, on a perusal of the papers in the proceeding, of the correctness of the view taken in Bledsoe v. State, 64 N. C., 392, to-wit, that our ‘recommendatory jurisdiction’ in regard to claims against the State does not embrace cases involving mere matters of fact, and that it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to impose upon the Court the labor of the trial of facts, and that the jurisdiction is confined to claims where the facts being agreed on it was supposed an opinion of the Supreme Court on important questions of law would aid the General Assembly to dispose of such cases, it having been before a question whether the Judges could consistently with their constitutional duties communicate an opinion to' the Legislature.” In Horne v. State, 82 N. C., 382, the Court said: “This provision of The Code is very broad in its terms, ‘Any person having any claim,’ and regai’ded in the light of a cotemporaneous exposition of the Constitution would seem to embrace all claims against the State; but this Court in construing the .section of the Constitution referred to (section 9 of Article IV), held that it was intended to apply only to cases wherein questions of law were involved, and that the jurisdiction of this Court ought not to be exercised in small matters of small value, particularly when there is no doubt about tbe law.” In Reeves v. State, 93 N. C., 257, tbe same view was expressed, and tbe Cburt added: “If tbe claim is a plain one, only involving questions of fact, it ought to be taken at once before tbe Legislature, unless its nature be sucb as that it may be presented to the Auditor, or some other ap<-propriate authority, for adjustment and allowance.” This case, as we have said, does not involve any question of law, for this Cburt bad at its February Term, 1897, in tbe ease of Blount v. Simmons, 120 N. C., 19, not only re-affirmed a former ruling that tbe Sítate was liable for the costs involved in tbe oyster-bed suits, but had particularly specified tbe amount of fees which each officer was entitled to for bis services; and tbe Legislature, therefore, could not stand in need of any recommendation from us as to its duty under tbe law, and tbe facts they had already passed upon. Counsel for tbe plaintiff took this view of their duty in connection with their client’s claim, knowing that there was no grave question of law involved, and went directly before tbe Legislature, as they should have done, under tbe intimation of tbe Cburt in tbe case of Reeves v. State, 93 N. C., 257, to have tbe facts ascertained, and an act passed making an appropriation to their client. We do- not feel called upon, therefore, to make any recommendation to tbe General Assembly in tbe premises. If we should do so tbe members of that body would have the right to feel justly offended that we should seek to point out their duty to them in a matter wherfe there was no law question involved and where they bad already investigated and passed upon the facts.