after stating the facts: We find no error in his Honor’s refusal to charge, or in his charge, though the latter is somewhat meager. But as there are no requests for special instructions, we presume that it was intended to present to us the simple question whether such a watercourse, as is described in the uncontradicted testimony, is a navigable stream. We are of opinion that it is, and that the defendant was properly convicted if the jury believed the evidence, the credibility of which was left to them.
This case is very similar to that of State v. Narrows Island Club; 100 N. C., 477, except that the defendant does not claim any individual ownership in the bed of the cove. For the reasons stated in that opinion, we do not think that this action can be maintained under section 1123 of The Code, but that it can be sustained as charging a common law offence. That case comes nearer settling the case at bar than any other we can find in the books, and we think is controlling.
There is a vast amount of learning upon the subject of navigable waters, much of which is inconsistent and the greater part of which is totally inapplicable to the physical *603conditions of our country. TJnder the common law of England, whence came tbe doctrine, tbe ebb and flow of tbe tide was tbe test of a navigable stream. Sueb streams were said to be publici juris, but tbe right of navigation might be acquired above tide-water. This rule operated very well in England, whose small size and low elevation confined actual navigation practically to tbe theoretical limits fixed by law. Eew, if any, of its streams are actually navigable for any practical purpose beyond tbe flow of the tide.
.For a time o-ur courts adhered to tbe definition of the common law, and found little difficulty in doing so, as this country was then thinly settled, with no towns of any importance above tide-water. At that time the navigability of a stream depended more upon the temper of the Indians living along its banks than upon its natural features. As, however, tíre settlements went inland and important towns were built where tides were imknown, the courts soon found that it was impossible to measure rivers, like the Hudson and the Mississippi, by the rule of the Thames. The rule was then modified so as to include among navigable streams all rivers as far up as they afforded a free passage for seagoing vessels; and about the same time its practical application was greatly extended by the development' of steam power, which enabled vessels to ascend rivers, the swiftness of whose currents had hitherto been a practical bar to navigation.
This rule seems to have been followed for many years in determining the limits of Federal jurisdiction; but it in turn was found insufficient h> meet the demands of industrial and commercial growth. In fact, it did not reach to the Great Lakes, which have but recently become to be regarded in their true light as inland seas, having a law unto themselves. In contemplation of law, they are for all practical purposes regarded as the “high seas.”
An interesting discussion of this subject is given by Chief *604Justice Taney, in the case of the Genesee Chief, 12 How., 443, and by Justice Bradley, in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S., 324. See also U. S. v. Rogers, 150 U. S., 249. The Admiralty rule as now generally recognized, is thus stated in Gould on Waters (3d Ed.), sec. 67: “The ebb and flow of the tide does not now constitute the test of the navigability of American waters, and those rivers are public and navigable in law which are navigable in fact. If, in their ordinary condition, by themselves or by uniting with other waters, they form a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water, they are 'navigable waters of the United States’ within the meaning of the Acts of Congress in which that phrase is employed.” The different States were of necessity compelled to extend this rule to- a greater or less extent to their inland streams, and to such coastal waters as are not within Federal jurisdiction. The rule now most generally adopted, and that which seems best fitted to our own domestic conditions, is that all watercourses are regarded as navigable in law that are navigable in fact. That is, that the public have the right to the unobstructed navigation as a public highway for all purposes of pleasure or profit, of all watercourses, whether tidal or inland, that are in their natural condition capable of such use. The navigability of a watercourse is therefore largely a question of fact for the jury, and its best test is the extent to which it has been so used by the public when unrestrained. And yet it would seem that there must be some element of a public highway, and that its navigation must be in some degree required by the necessity or convenience of the public. It should not depend entirely upon the personal whim of an individual. We are not prepared to say that a land owner would be liable to criminal prosecution because he happened to put a water-gate across a creek up *605wbiob otherwise an idle hunter might be able to pole a canoe; nor are we now dealing with -any right except that of simple navigation.
It appears from the evidence that the public were in the habit of passing through North Sand Cove before it was stopped up, and that by its use the distance from one part of the sound to another was shortened and navigation rendered safer in rough weather. These conditions constitute ample evidence of a navigable stream. Gould on Watercourses, secs. 42, 43, 54, 57, 60, 86; Angelí on Watercourses, secs. 537, 541, 550; Wood on Nuisances, secs. 451, 452, 453, 455, 456; Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N. C., 30; Collins v. Benbury, 25 N. C., 277; same case, 27 N. C., 118; Fagan v. Armistead, 33 N. C., 433; Lewis v. Keeling, 46 N. C., 299; State v. Glen, 52 N. C., 321; State v. Parrott, supra; Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N. C., 675; State v. Narrows Island Club, supra; Hodges v. Williams, 95 N. C., 331; McLaughlin v. Manufacturing Co., 103 N. C., 100, 108; State v. Eason, 114 N. C., 787; Commissioners v. Lumber Co., 116 N. C., 731; Manufacturing Co. v. Railroad, 117 N. C., 579; Staton v. Wimberly, 122 N. C., 107, 110.
Many of these cases do not involve directly the right of navigation, as they relate principally to other matters, such as the right of entry or fishing, but they all tend more or less accurately to show the distinction in this State between navigable and non-navigable watercourses.
That the obstruction of a navigable stream is a public nuisance is well settled by reason and authority. State v. Dibble, 49 N. C., 107; State v. Parrott, 71 N. C., 311; State v. Narrows Island Club, supra; Wood on Nuisances, secs. 478, 483, 484; Gould on Waters, secs. 91, 92, 93, 94, 140; Angell on Watercourses, sec. 554.
As no error appears in the trial of the action, the judgment of the Court below- is affirmed.
Affirmed.