The principal points in this case are decided in Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C., 32, and adversely to the plaintiffs. Indeed, Chapter 125, Acts 1891, (the charter of Asheville,) is less open to objection than the Act construed in Raleigh v. Peace. It makes each street, or portion of a street, improved a taxing district (Cooley Const. Lim.,624, 6th Ed.) by requiring the cost of the total improvement on each street, or portion of a street improved, to be ascertained and one-third thereof assessed upon the property abutting on each side of the street,, proportioned according to the “frontage” of each owner, and provides means whereby each property owner may contest Irs assessment by proceedings begun before the board of aldermen, with the right of appeal. The act is uniform in the method of assessment. The will of the Legislature is clearly expressed, and the courts have no power to interfere unless an act is plainly unconstitutional. If the unconstitutional ity of an act is not beyond reasonable doubt, the courts will uphold it. King v. Railroad, 66 N. C., 297. It is not a question in any wise of eminent domain, or taking private property for public use, (White v. Bloomington, 94 *852Ill., 604,) and there is due process of law as ample notice of the assessment, with opportunity to be heard, is given the property holder. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97. While other modes oí assessment are valid, that of assessing by the front foot is not only sustained by the numerous cases cited in Raleigh v. Peace, supra, and numerous other cases, among them Chicago v. Joliet, 39 N. E. Rep., 1077; McKeesport v. Busch, 33 N. E., Rep., 49, and cases cited in Cooley on Taxation, 644, but the “ frontage” rule is essentially equitable. By that rule the owner of unimproved property, who has contributed nothing to the prosperity of the city, but who is benefited by all improvement, pays his just share towards the enhanced value of his property, whereas, linder an assessment upon the basis of the value of each lot, the buildings, which have no value added to them by the improvements, contribute. The added value being to the land, the front foot rule, regardless whether the property is improved or unimproved, is ordinarily the most just. There may be cases in which the length of the taxing district and the diversity of values may make the assessment grossly lacking in uniformity. If that is so in this case, that objection can be raised in proceedings regularly brought under the Act of 1891, Oh. 135.
While a local assessment is not a tax within the purport of constitutional limitation upon taxation — Raleigh v. Peace, supra — yet as the plaintiffs might have made their annual payment (1-20) and have had their action at law to recover it back, they were not entitled to the equitable relief by injunction. There was no irreparable damages threatened, the cost being divided into 20 annual payments, with 12 month’s right to redeem in event of a sale for nonpayment of an assessment. At any rate the act itself prescribed a special method (Sec. 6) by which the validity and *853regularity of such assessments can be contested and the plaintiffs having that remedy, can not proceed by injunction. McIntyre v. Railroad, 67 N. C., 278. This remedy is also adequate as. to the culvert and all other points of detail excepted to.
As to the point, which was much pressed, that the act contemplated charging the property on each side with only 1 — 6 of the cost of the improvement, it seems to us that it is clear beyond ambiguity that one-third of the cost is to be assessed on the real estate on each side of the street. The language of Sec. 4 provides that “ the mayor and board of aldermen shall assess one-third of the cost of grading, paving, &o., on the real estate abutting on each side of the street so improved or repaired.” Section 5 provides that the mayor and board of aldermen shall “ charge to such real estate on each side of the street, upon which work is done, one-third of the cost of such improvement.” If this could possibly, by any reasonable method of eonstructionj be held to admit of a doubt that the property on each side of the street should pay one-third of the cost, and consequently that the property on the two sides should pay two-thirds of the cost, the matter is placed beyond controversy by the further provision in Section 7 that the city itself should pay one-third, u the abutting land on each side assuming the liability hereinbefore created,” i. e. two-thirds. Thus the whole cost is provide 1 for ; one-third by the city, and one-third by the property on each side of the street improved. The act being constitutional, whether any particular lot is over-assessed or improperly assessed is a matter which must be litigated in the manner and by the proceeding provided for that purpose by the act itself. "Whether the plaintiffs or any of them are estopped by their conduct from insisting upon their objections to the assessment upon their property is a matter which will come up *854in such proceeding, and need not be considered here. The injunction was improvident!/ granted and must be dissolved.
Error.
' Aveky, J\, did not sit upon the hearing of this case.