Tbe only assignment of error, upon which the defendant has the right to insist here, is the failure of the court to give the instructions asked and the substitution of those given for them.
It was admitted to be the duty of the defendant to keep its streets and sidewalks in reasonably safe condition, and it seems that the instruction, upon which the exceptions are founded, does not relate to the question whether the municipality was negligent in suffering them to become obstructed, as described by the witnesses. The prayer of the defendant proceeds upon the idea of conceding that the city was culpable, but of denying that its carelessuess was the proximate cause of the injury. It is not contended *666that the plaintiff is precluded from recovery on the ground that the injury was due to want of care on the part of a fellow-servant. Though he was employed to drive a team for the city, he could beheld to no more rigid rule of diligence than that applicable to any other resident of the-town. The fact that he had opportunity to become familiar with defects in the streets was evidence which the jury might have considered in determining whether he was actually cognizant of and recklessly disregarded the danger at the time of the accident. The court could not assume,, from the fact that the plaintiff had had previous knowledge of the obstruction, that he actually saw and understood the condition of the street at the time. He had a right to assume that the defendant had discharged its duty, and to act upon that assumption. Russell v. Monroe, 116 N. C., 720. Neither lienor other residents of the municipality were required, as the court properly told the jury, to carry in their hands a map of obstructions in the streets, made out like a mariner’s chart, upon the supposition that the city authorities would never be aroused to action by a sense of their duty to the public.
The court also submitted fairly to the jury the questions-whether the defendant was warned of the danger of driving fast and forbidden to do so, whether he was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and whether, if he was careless in either respect,, such negligence contributed proximately or concurrently with the plaintiff’s omission of' duty to cause the injury. The attention of the jury-was properly called to the subjects to which their inquiries should be addressed. The instructions asked by the defendant (numbered 5, 6 and 7) were so drawn as to assume that the jury must — not that they might — find the facts according to defendant’s contention. It was not error therefore to refuse to adopt the language of thes *667prayers and withdraw from the jury questions upon which it was their right and their duty to pass.
Unless the jury found that the injury was caused by the carelessness of the city authorities in failing to provide a. better seat or stronger reins, it was needless for them to-know or consider the law relating to defective implements. But, with the'preliminary caution that the instruction upon this subject would be applicable only in case they should find the injury directly due to such defects, the court stated very clearly and correctly the rule of law governing the liability of the defendant in that contingency.
No other inference can be drawn from a careful review of the charge given in lieu of that asked in connection with the verdict than that the jury believed from the testimony, (1) that the plaintiff was not intoxicated, (2) that either he had not been warned to drive slowly or had acted upon the warning if given ; (3) that neither the defective-condition of the seat nor the reins was the proximate cause of the accident; (4) that the plaintiff did not actually see or have his attention called to the obstruction of the street when he was driving towards it just before the injury was sustained. We conclude therefore that there was no error.
No Error.