This is an action to recover bach usurious interest paid to the defendant by the plaintiff, commenced on the 11th day of March, 1895. It was admitted on the argument here that Miller v. Insurance Co., at this Term, decided all the matters involved in this case, except three : First, whether the plaintiff being a non-resident could maintain this action ; secondly, whether this was a Virginia contract or a North Carolina contract; and thirdly, as to whether the interest paid by plaintiff more than two years before the commencement of the action should be included in the recovery or not.
The answer to the second proposition will substantially answer the first. The defendant is a Virginia corporation, but by comity is doing an insurance business in this State, and has an office in the town of Durham, and an agent *434located at that place. The local agent negotiated this loan in Durham, which defendant alleges is a part of its business and is authorized by its charter. All the interest on this loan was paid to the local agent in Durham, upon whom service of process in this case was served. It was a North Carolina contract.
The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the defendant by personal service, made according to law. And as defendant failed to show authority for this contention, wTe are at a loss to know upon what ground it is put, and we must sustain the jurisdiction of the court. In Sherrill v. Tel. Co., 109 N. C., 527, and 116 N. C., 655, and a number of other cases, similar to this, the courts have acted upon the idea that they had jurisdiction. But it does not appear in these cases that this question was directly presented. It may have been an oversight in the counsel in these cases not to do so. And while these points are made in the case on appeal, we do not think they were seriously relied on here. The main point in the case, argued and relied on here, was the question of time for which the plaintiff should be allowed to recover, plaintiff contending that he should recover double the amount of all the usurious interest he had paid, and defendant contending that he should not be allowed to recover for any interest paid more than two years before the commencement of the action. The court held with the defendant on this point and the plaintiff excepted.
This contract, by which the plaintiff borrowed $900 from the defendant, was made in June, 1891, as plaintiff alleges. And plaintiff’s right of action, therefore, rests upon Section 3836 of The Code. The Act of 1895, Ch. 69, was ratified on the 21st day of February, 1895. But it expressly provides that it is not to apply to any contracts entered into before its ratification. If the Act of 1895 had *435applied, the contention ,of plaintiff would have been correct, as it provides for bringing an action to recover back double the amount- of usurious interest paid, if the action is brought within two years after the payment in full of such indebtedness, in this respect changing Section 3836 of The Gode, which provides that “ the action must be brought ■ within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred.”
It was contended for the plaintiff that the Statute of Limitations must'be pleaded, and, as the defendant had not done so in this case, he could not have the benefit of this defense, and cited authorities to sustain this position. The plaintiff is correct in his law, but it has no application to this case. The defendant’s contention does not depend on the statute of limitations, but upon plaintiffs right of action. His right to recover anything depends upon the statute. It is purely a statutory action, and he must comply with the terms of the statute, or he cannot recover. Therefore, under Section 3836 of The Gode, unless he commences his action within two years from th,e usurious transaction, he has no cause of action. Taylor v. Iron & Coal Co., 94 N. C., 525; Best v. Kinston, 106 N. C., 205. There is no error and the judgment is affirmed.
In Defendant'1 s Appeal.
"We see no error in this appeal. The question of time for which plaintiff is allowed to recover is decided in plaintiff’s appeal, — that there was no error in the court’s holding that plaintiff could only recover for usurious interest paid within two years next before commencing his action. And the only other question presented by this appeal is as to what amount the plaintiff should recover. A jury trial was waived and the judge found the facts. And his findings of fact can no more be reviewed by this Court than if they had been found by a *436jury. Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S., on p. 688. We can only review him upon questions of law. The counsel on both sides contend that his findings of fact — the amount of plaintiff’s recovery — are not correct; plaintiff contending it should have been for more, and defendant contending it should have been foi a less amount. But as we find that his findings were based upon correct principles of law, they are conclusive. There is no error and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.