This Court, in State v. Jeffries, 117 N.C., 727, said : “ There are some few exceptions to the almost universal rule of law, that evidence of a distinct substantive offence cannot be admitted in support of another offence.” The exceptions to the rule are to be found in those cases in which testimony concerning independent offences has been admitted because of the necessity of proving the quo animo, or the guilty knowledge of the defendant, and also for purposes of identification of the defendant. We do not see how this case can be taken out of the general rule above stated, on the ground of its-falling under any of the exceptions. If the testimony had shown that the defendant had been by compulsion made to pay the $125 which he gave or paid to the prose-cutrix, and that he had been compelled to pay it because' he had seduced her under a promise of marriage, the testimony, might have been admissible both to prove the defendant’s knowledge of her possession of the money and the guilty intent in taking it from her — to get back that which he had been compelled to pay for the injury he had done her. It is not necessary to constitute the crime of larceny that the intent should be lucri causa. That is generally the motive which influences the thief, but the-*1259larceny is complete if the owner is deprived fraudulently of his property, the taker having a felonious intent to convert it to his own use, whatever application he may after-wards make of it. But the testimony in the ease shows no such condition of things. It does not show éitlier that the $125 was paid to the prosecutrix by reason of the defendant’s seduction of her, or that he paid it to her grudgingly, or unwillingly, or by compulsion. Under no condition of this case ought the testimony as to the inability of the defendant to make good his promise of marriage to the prosecutrix on account of his being a married man be admitted. That could only prejudice the defendant and throw no light on the transaction. "
There was error in the ruling of the court below, for which there must be a'new trial.