This is an action for the possession of personal property described in the complaint. The action is brought by “Heath, Morrow & Co.” This is the only description given of plaintiffs in the summons and complaint. To this complaint defendants demur and assign as one of the grounds of demurrer, “1st. For that the names of the parties plaintiff either in the summons or complaint, are not given.”
This we think is a fatal defect to plaintiffs’ action. Palin v. Small, 63 N. C., 484. Our attention was called to Cowan v. Baird, 77 N. C., 201, where the action was in the name of “Cowan, McOlung & Co,” against the defendant Baird and others, in which defendants demurred and the demurrer was overruled. But this action was upon a note, given ¿>y defendants to “Cowan, MeClung & Co,”' and while the grounds are not given upon which the court rested its judgment, it must have been for the reason that defendants had contracted with plaintiffs in this name and were estopped thereby to deny the partnership. As in the case of Attorney General v. Simonton, 78 N. C., 57, where it was held that parties claiming to be a bank though they had never organized under the charter were estopped to deny the existence of the bank as to their creditors.
This view reconciles Cowen v. Baird, supra, with Palin v. Small, supra, while they would be in conflict, but for this distinction in the cases.
The cases of Wall v. Jarrott, 3 Ired., 42, and Lash v. Arnold, 8 Jones, 206, while they sustain judgments taken in the firm nanie, both admit that if the objection had been to the “writ” it would have been good. This was evi*508dently the rule under the old practice. And while The Oode has made many changes in the forms of actions and mode of procedure, we do not think it has made any change in this respect.
"We have examined the other grounds assigned in the demurrer, and do not think they can be sustained. The second ground is that the action is brought against a married woman without joining her husband. But the complaint alleges that the husband is now a fugitive from justice, and non-resident of the State. Code, Sec. 1832 ; Finley v. Saunders, 98 N. C., 462. And besides, this is an action for the possession of personal property which plaintiifs allege belongs to them, and that defendants are wrongfully withholding from plaintiifs. This the defendant’s wife admits by her demurrer, but says “my husband has fled the State, and, therefore, you cannot get your property from me.” This cannot be the law.
The third assignment is that no demand was made before the action was brought. But plaintiifs allege that they are the owners of this property, and that defendants are “in the unlawful and wrongful possession of the property, and unlawfully withholding the possession from plaintiffs.” This is admitted by the defendants’ demurrer, and yet they say it was necessary for plaintiffs to make a demand before bringing their action. The reason why a demand in any case is required is that defendant may surrender the property without the trouble and cost of a suit. And when it appears, as in this action, that defendants still claim the right to hold the property, no demand is necessary. Wiley v. Logan, 95 N. C., 358; Rich v. Hobson, 112 N. C., 79.
The fourth assignment is “for that the summons in the action simply designates one of the defendants as Mrs. Morgan.” But defendants do not, and cannot demur to *509the summons, which is only for the purpose of bringing the defendants into court. This they have done, and hied their demurrer, which put them iu court. Rut the complaint, to which they demur, states the defendants as being “Mrs. S. E. Morgan and John Morgan.” So this assignment, as well as the second and third, are without merit, and is overruled.
But the first assignment is sustained, and there was error in the judgment of the court overruling it.
Error.