No question affecting the homestead is involved in this case, though that view was strenuously pressed on the argument. The father of the defendant had his homestead, embracing three tracts of land, allotted to him in 1879. The defendant put in evidence that her father executed to her on June 18, 1883, a deed for the locus in quo, which is one of said three tracts. This deed w'as registered March 13, 1891. The father’s homestead was re-allotted in 1890, other land being put in place of that conveyed to defendants. The interesting question whether a homesteader can have a second homestead allotted to him ■when he has conveyed away the whole or part of his allotted homestead is not before us, as there is nothing here *564calling ill question the validity of the homestead of 1890. The homesteader was expressly empowered to convey the homestead land bjr the Constitution, Art. X, sec. 8, in the manner there provided. Having legally conveyed his homestead in the constitutional mode, the homesteader cannot now claim the locus in quo as part of such homestead, nor does he do so. The plaintiff bought at execution sale (September, 1890) under a judgment against the grantor in said deed, which judgment was docketed May 6, 1889. The Sheriff executed a deed to plaintiff December 22, 1890, and it was registered January 21,'1891.
There is no question arising here as to what estate was conveyed by the father to his daughter, if the registration laws were complied with, for the conveyance to the daughter, made in 1883, prior to the lien of the judgment docketed in 1889, carried as to the plaintiff a fee-simple, although the land had previously been allowed as a part of the grantor's homestead. The question is solely between the grantee in the deed and the purchaser under execution against the grantor. The defendant claims under a deed from her father which is registered March 13, 1891. The plaintiff claims under a Sheriff’s deed, under an execution against the grantor, which was registered January 21, 1891. The grantor, homesteader, is barred by his deed. He has no interest in the locus in quo, and is asserting none. This case comes under the provisions of chapter 147, Acts 1885. Though the deed purports to have been executed prior to the passage of the act it does not come within the proviso thereof, for there was no actual notice at the Sheriff’s sale that the defendant was in possession, nor constructive notice, for upon the evidence the .grantor, not his daughter, remained in possession after execution of the deed in 1883, receiving all the time the rents and profits and listing the land for taxes in his own name, and at first the grantor *565seemed disposed to object to the assignment of the homestead of 1890, but afterwards assented. This would indicate, if anything, that he was apparently in possession for himself. There was certainly neither actual, nor constructive notice that the defendant was in possession or had any deed. Under the Act of 1885 the plaintiff’s prior registered deed takes the property in preference to the junior registered deed, though executed first. This is the rule as between mortgages under The Code, §1254, of which the Act of 1885 is a copjr verbatim et literatim, thus applying to the registration of deeds the same rule applicable to the registration of mortgages. These words having been construed as to the registration of mortgages, when they are copied and used by the Legislature as to the registration of deeds, must bear identically the same meaning. It cannot be said that the plaintiff, who purchased at an execution sale, took the land subject to the rights of the grantee under the unregistered deed. The principle that such a purchaser stands in the place of the judgment debtor is excluded by the statute in so far as it relates to unregistered conveyances, a judgment creditor and a purchaser under execution being within the terms of the act. The grantor is barred by his deed. He cannot claim the land as his homestead, and is not doing so. The defendant cannot avail herself of the unregistered deed to keep off the grant- or’s creditors. The locus in quo was, therefore, as to the creditors, simply former homestead land, as to which the grantor had waived his homestead in the constitutional mode by deed, with prescribed formalities. The grantee not having made her deed available by registration, as the statute requires, the land remained subject to execution for the grantor’s debts, and the Sheriff’s deed gave the same title to the plaintiff as if the grantor had himself executed a deed instead of the Sheriff, on December 22, 1890, and the plaintiff bad registered it on January 21,1891, as he did *566the Sheriffs deed, prior to the registration of defendant’s deed on March 13, 1891. The plaintiff purchaser at execution sale had no notice that this land had ever been embraced in a homestead, as the allotment of 1879 was not recorded as required by The Code, §504. He had no notice by registration or otherwise that the defendant held a deed for it, nor any notice, actual or constructive, that she was in possession. There was no objection made at the sale. The homesteader was in possession of another duly allotted and registered homestead, to which he had filed no exception. He made no claim then-nor since to this tract as part of his homestead. In fact, he had solemnly waived all claim to the land by deed. If, under these circumstances, the plaintiff did not get a good title no purchaser at an execution sale would ever be safe. The policy of our law is to encourage bidders at such sales so that property may bring a fair price. Error.