It is admitted that the title to the land in controversy has passed out of the State, and that the plaintiff and those under whom he claims have had an actual possession, including about fourteen acres enclosed under fence, for about fifty years. In order to establish certain lines and corners claimed as the boundaries, and to show constructive possession up to them, the plaintiff W. W. Lewis offered the deed of his father, William Lewis, to himself, dated May 7, 1854, conveying a tract of land described as “ Canary, containing 127 acres”; the deed of Clarissa Leggett to said William Lewis, dated the 20th of September, 1827, and conveying a tract of land described as “Canary Island, East Kendrick creek”; also a deed from Henry Hardy to William Lewis, dated August 26,1828, and conveying a tract of land described as “ Canary Island, 100 acres, more or less.” There were two older conveyances offered also — one describing the tract conveyed as “Canary,” the other as the “East Lee Mill-pond Covant tract, 100 acres, more or less.” The plaintiff contended that he had offered testimony, tending to show that the tract of land was known both as “ Canary” and “ Canary Island,” which were generally understood to mean the same tract; that it lay adjacent to Kendrick’s creek on East Lee mill-pond, which two names desci’ibed thesame body of water, and tending also to designate the known boundaries of the island and to point out corners, which, as points upon lines, would indicate the exact location of the boundary around the whole tract The defendant admitted that the plaintiff had acquired title to his enclosure, but contended that he had not offered sufficient evidence to go to the jury upon the question of the location of the lines. The plaintiff testified that the description Canary or Canary Island was used to describe a tract of land which was more definitely designated in two ways — (1) by certain corners at different angles on the *61outside boundary; (2) by including “the high laud surrounded by the dismal.” It was in evidence also that the water originally extended to some of these lines and corners, but had receded on account of the more recent drainage. The witness testified that one Volivay pointed out the lines that included the high lands bounded by the dismal. Though there was conflicting evidence as to the extent of the high lands, still there was testimony tending to show that the lines pointed out by Volivay, the owner of an adjacent tract, was the original high land not covered by the water at its ordinary height, though it was in evidence that not more than one and a half acres, including the plaintiff’s dwelling-house, was above the high-water mark in great freshets. The plaintiff testified that the corners shown by himself to the surveyor were on the margin of the high land, as pointed out by Voli-vay, and marked angles pn the original water-line. In the absence of any evidence as to corners, the Court might have left the question of the location of the boundary lines claimed by the plaintiff upon the declaration of Volivay that it was governed by the original extent of the high lands or land not covered by the dismal.
When an island in an unnavigable stream or in a swamp is granted by the name by which it is generally known, it is not necessary to run or call for lines and corners. The low-water margin of the island is esteemed more durable and preferable, as a certain description, to courses and distances. Tiedman, sections 836 and 838.
The testimony of the plaintiff is clearly susceptible of the construction that the deceased declarant, Volivay, had pointed out the original low-water line, which is still indicated by corners marked at some of the angles along said marginal line, though subsequent drainage may have caused the water to recede and leave a larger area uncovered in the ordinary condition of the swamp. Such enlargement of the original island by artificial means was not an accretion .that enured to the plaintiff’s benefit, and, if not, it was compe*62tent as in all such cases to show the original low-water line as defining the limits of the island when granted. Tiedman, section 685 et seq.; Malone on R. P., p. 253. It is not necessary to cite authority to show that by the grant of an island, designated by the name by which it is generally known, all of the land surrounded by water at the low-water mark passes. When once it does so pass, sudden accretions are not added to it, and when nature no longer marks the original line man may prove by oral testimony of living witnesses or competent declarations of persons deceased where the land was located when the land was granted.
Without passing upon the sufficiency of the proof of course and distance offered, we think, therefore, that there was testimony upon which the jury might have located Canary or Canary Island by the original extent of the high lands. The question whether the greater weight of testimony was upon the one side or the other was not one addressed to the Court below, and is not to be considered by us. However the boundaries of his deed may be ascertained, when located the law presumes that the plaintiff claimed up to them. McLean v. Smith, 106 N. C., 172; Ruffin v. Overby, 105 N. C., 78.
The plaintiff testified that the declarations of Yolivay were made ante litem motam and when Volivay was disinterested, and this was not denied. Though he was an adjacent landowner at the time, his declarations were nevertheless competent. Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. C., 309; Dugger v. McKesson, 100 N. C., 1; Fry v. Curry, 103 N. C., 203.
For the reasons given, we think that there was no error in submitting the question of the extent of the plaintiff’s boundary to the jury. The testimony as to the marking'of corner trees was competent, if for no other pupose, as corroborative evidence to show that marks were made to indicate the margin of the original island, and when one tree originally marked had disappeared, it was competent to show that another was marked to designate where it had stood.
There was No Error.