It is a well established principle that where, upon a purchase of property, the conveyance of the legal title is taken in the name of one person while the consideration is given or paid by another, at the same time or previously, and as part of the same transaction, the parties being strangers to each other, a resulting trust' immediate!}' arises from the transaction, and the person named in the conveyance will be a trustee for the party from 'whom the consideration proceeds.
*403“The rule has its foundation in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase-money intends the purchase for his own benefit, and not for another, and that the conveyance in the name of another is a matter of convenience and arrangement between the parties for collateral purposes.”- 1 Perry Trusts; 2 Story Eq. Jur., 1201; Bisham Eq. Juris., §79; Lewin on Trusts, 143. The above quotation from Mr. Perry, which is fully sustained by the authorities we have cited, is sufficient to meet -the proposition' of the defendant, that if the plaintiff consented that the title should be taken in the name of George J. Moore, the transaction amounted to a gift, and there could be no resulting trust. An examination of the authorities will disclose that in many of the cases the title was intentionally taken in the name of the third person as a matter of “convenience and arrangement” of the parties, and it is manifest that the exception of the defendant in this respect cannot be sustained.
Undoubtedly, párol evidence may be received to rebut a resulting trust, but the burden of proof is upon the nominal purchaser, and he must establish by sufficient testimony that it was intended that he should take a beneficial interest. 1 Perry Trust, 140; 2 Sugden Vendor & P., 139. There is no evidence in this case of any sueh purpose, nor, indeed, is there any evidence from which we can clearly infer that the plaintiff knew or assented to the title being taken in the name of the said Moore. Neither is there any force in the exception addressed to the charge as to the intensity of proof. His Honor charged “ that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff,” and that “the law gave a peculiar force and solemnity to deeds, and would not allow them to be overthrown by mere words, but only by facts, and that these facts must be strong, convincing and unequivocal.” This, we think, was a substantial compliance with the rule laid down in Harding v. Long, 103 N. C., 1, and the cases there cited. *404We are also of the opinion that the facts relied upon, dehors the deed, were sufficient to authorize the finding in favor of the resulting trust.
The issue as to whether the title was taken in the name of Moore for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding the creditors of the plaintiff, was answered in the negative. Had it been answered in the affirmative, it is clear that the plaintiff would have no standing in a Court of Equity. Turner v. Elford, 5 Jones’ Eq., 106. But it is insisted that this result must follow.from the conduct of the plaintiff some two or three years after the creation of the trust. It seems that a deed from Moore to the plaintiff had been prepared, but not executed, and that the plaintiff, under the mistaken idea that he was liable as surety upon a supersedeas bond for $6,000, instead of an appeal bond for $25, wrote to the said Moore, for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the supposed liability, not to execute the said deed but to let the legal title continue in his name. His Honor held that this, in connection with other circumstances, might be considered by the jurj^ in determining the issue above mentioned as to the intent with which-the deed was originally made to Moore, but that, in the absence-of any fraudulent intent existing at that time, this subsequent, conduct of the plaintiff could not defeat his equitable rights-in the said land. The principle invoked by the defendant is that, as between wrongdoers, the Courts will not interfere, but will leave each in the position which his own acts have placed him. There must, of course, be some act by which) his relation to his property is changed; otherwise there is-nothing upon which the principle can operate. In the present, case the plaintiff did nothing which in the least altered his relation to the land. The legal title had not been made to him, and by postponing the execution of the conveyance he parted with nothing. The mere intention to defraud, unaccompanied by some change or disposition of pioperty, cannot have the effect of depriving the owner of his interest therein. *405We have examined the authorities cited by defendants’ counsel, but they do not establish his contention. Yery clearly the case of Warlick v. White, 86 N. C., 139, is not in point. In that case a deed had been made by the husband directly to the wife and, being lost, the Court held that it would not be upheld in equity as against the heirs of the husband. There was no valuable consideration, and the Court refused her relief, because, while her husband was in the army, she had adulterous intercourse with a negro, the fruit of which was a mulatto child, born soon after the death of her husband. In our case the entire consideration proceeded from the plaintiff, and, whatever his intentions may have been, in view of his supposed insolvency, he has done nothing, as we have said, by which his equitable rights in the property were changed.
As to the property substituted for a part of that affected with the trust, it is settled that the plaintiff may follow it, as he has done in this case. See authorities cited in Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N. C., 342.
We have carefully examined, the whole record, and are unable to discover any ground wdiich entitles the defendants to-a new trial. It may not be improper to observe that the conclusion reached is in furtherance of justice, as tlie plaintiff, it seems, has actually charged this property with a mortgage to secure some of his creditors, wdiile the defendants are relying upon a mere technicality to defeat the rights of those creditors, as well as the plaintiff’s, and get the property without having paid for it.