We will consider the defendants’ exceptions seriatim as set out in the case on appeal.
1. It was a matter entirely within the discretion of his Honor to determine whether or not the cause should be tried before some of the mortgagees were brought in. The plaintiff was willing to try the case with the parties then in Court. The defendants had excepted to the order made at the instance of the plaintiff to bring in the mortgagees, thus insisting that they were not necessary parties. Plaintiff seems by his action to have conceded that that exception was well taken, in part, at least, and thereupon it was for his Honor to say if a trial should then be had. If any good cause for a postponement had been shown, no doubt it would have been granted. It appears from the record that the mortgages spoken of were put upon the lands prior to the alleged fraudulent transfer by the mortgagor to his mother and son-in-law. Their validity is not in any way affected by the verdict and judgment.
*3772. The fact that the plaintiff had examined the defendant W. H. Wheeler, under the provisions of section 581 of The Code, did not compel the plaintiff to use that testimony on the trial, nor did it make that defendant in any sense the plaintiff’s witness. But if so, we are unable to see how the defendants’ cause could have been prejudiced by the questions and answers set out in this exception.
3 We think there was no good ground for this exception, but if there were, it was completely obviated by the subsequent testimony of the defendant, fully establishing the very fact which the plaintiff sought to prove by the evidence objected to here.
4. The tax return made by defendants was properly submitted to the consideration of the jury. If they really owned the land here in dispute, it was their duty to return it for taxation. That they failed to so return it was some evidence that they did not consider themselves as the owners thereof.
5. This exception was not pressed before us.
6. The defendants excepted “ to the ruling declining to permit defendants to open and conclnde.” The decision of his Honor upon this point is not reviewable here. Rule 6.
7. His Honor might have insisted that the plaintiff’s prayers for special instructions were handed to him after the time prescribed, and that he could not be required to consider them. That was his privilege under the rule. The defendants could have no right to object to his exercising that privilege, or his failure to do so.
8. This exception is “ for misdirection in charging the jury as requested by plaintiff, which charge is recited above.” A reference to the charge so “recited above,” will show that it contains numerousdistinct propositions. Exceptions should be specific. Williams v. Johnston, 94 N. C., 633. The evidence taken on the trial has not been sent up to us. It would be unjust to the appellees to allow the appellants, under such a general exception, to single out here some one *378of the propositions contained in that charge, and insist that there appeared error in giving it, when if a specific objection had been noted, either on the motion for a new trial, or when the case on appeal was tendered by them, there might, perhaps, have been incorporated in the ease evidence produced on the (rial or other parts of the charge that would show the pertinence and propriety of that which is here pointed out as objectionable. We cannot, therefore, consider this exception; it is too general.
9. AYe find no reasonable objection to the illustration which his Honor used in his charge to the jury. Inadequacy of price will not .per se vitiate a sale made by an insolvent to a near relative, or to another, unless it is so gross that the Court must sternly say to such purchaser that he got the property for nothing (Fullenwider v. Roberts, 4 Dev. & Bat., 278); but inadequacy of price, if found to exist, is always a suspicious circumstance in the examination into any transfer of property, for the very good reason that men do not usually sell their land for less than it is worth, and when we find them doing so, especially when insolvent, it is not unreasonable to look at such a transaction with suspicious scrutiny. And certainly, the greater the discrepancy, the greater the suspicion, until it reaches that point where, because of excessive inadequacy, the law stamps the pretended sale as no sale at all. We find no error, and the judgment is '
Affirmed.