The plaintiff was asked: “State when and where you first saw the book now shown you.” The object of the question as stated by plaintiff’s counsel was “to show that she first saw the book in the hands of defendant’s intestate, at the time lie handed it to her on the day of the marriage.” P'he intestate’s “ handing her the book ” was a personal transaction between the plaintiff and the deceased, and the question being asked, as stated by her counsel, with a *173view of bringing out that as a part of her statement, it was properly ruled out under section 590 of The Code. It is true it was competent to show by her that she saw the book in the hands of the intestate ©n the day of her marriage (Gray v. Cooper, 65 N. C., 183; March v. Verble, 79 N. C., 19; McCall v. Wilson, 101 N. C., 598), since that would not have been a transaction with the intestate. But the plaintiff’s husband had testified that the book had been handed to the plaintiff by the intestate, and the object seems to have been to corroborate him bjr her testimony embracing that fact. If the object had been only to indicate the time, that could have been done by stating simply that she saw the book in the hands of the intestate on the day of the marriage. But whatever the object may have been, we can only pass upon the inquiry as made. That the plaintiff did not properly restrict the inquiry or amend it so as to exclude the incompetent matter was her own fault. The other exception is without merit, and 'was not relied on in this Court.
No Error.