It seems to have been conceded that the question in this case was'whether title to the land covered by the water of the Stallings mill-pond passed out of the heirs of Stallings by virtue of the proceedings for partition in the Court of Equity of Gates County in 1860 and the sale thereunder; for that if it did not so pass, the plaintiffs had acquired title to the same by subsequent proceedings and deed.
The first exception was to thp refusal of his Honor to admit parol testimony to show that only the mill and two acres were sold, and not the tract of land covered by water, known as the mill-pond. The petition for partition, filed in 1860, describes the property as a tract of land covered by water, with a water-mill thereon, and the report of AY. H. Manning, Clerk and Master to the Court at the succeeding term, recites the sale by him of the mill and appurtenances described in the petition. Neither the deed nor any other part of the record than the petition and report, was sent up with the case 021 appeal, but 210 objection was made by the plaintiff to the wa2it of the rest of the record. Tak-hig that portion of the record, to which we have referred, as all that the parties desired us to examine, it could 2iot be impeached in this proceeding by parol testimony or otherwise. It must stand mrtil attacked in a proper pro-ceedmg and reformed by the Court which made it. Reid v. Kelly, 1 Dev., 313. Plaintiff’s counsel in his brief, recog-2iizing this principle, contends that while the record cannot be thus impeached, yet it may be explained. But it has been often said that a record speaks for itself; it cannot be explained. Wade v. Odencal, 3 Dev., 423; Kerr v. Brandon, 84 N. C., 128; Hopper v. Justice, 111 N. C., 418.
This does not bring us in conflict with the principle stated hi Smith v. Lowe, 5 Ired., 197, a2id the later cases upon the same lme, such as Walters v. Moore, 90 N. C., 41, and *126 Curlee v. Smith, 91 N. C., 172, where it is held that “the records of a Court professing to state the judicial transactions of the Court itself cannot be contradicted by parol evidence or any other proof, for they import verity in themselves. But the acts and doings out of Court of a ministerial officer, as the Clerk in issuing writs, Constables and Sheriffs in making returns on warrants, writs, etc., although required by law to be returned into a Court of Record, are only prima facie to be taken as true, and are not conclusive evidence of the things they write; they may be contradicted by any evidence and shown to be false, antedated, etc.” It was not contended, and it could not be successfully maintained, that the report of a commissioner to make sale under direction of the Court, and which was necessary to be passed upon and confirmed by the Court in order to give effect to the sale after the same had been filed and confirmed and made a part of the record, would be upon the same footing as the returns of Sheriffs and Constables, which need no order of confirmation to give them validity.
The second exception would seem to lose force for the same reason, as an attempt to vary the record by parol testimony.
We concur with his Honor upon the third exception. It might have, been competent, as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, to show that this was not the record of tlié Court by proving an interlineation fraudulently made which constituted no part of the record; but it could not be done by simply handing the paper to the jury for them to compare the handwriting of the interlined words with that of the body of the petition. Such comparison of handwriting is not permitted to be done by the jury in the Courts of this State. Fuller v. Fox, 101 N. C., 119.
Judgment Affirmed.