The statute (The Gode, § 3747) provides that, in addition to their per diem, jurors shall receive “not exceeding five cents,” etc., “ per mile of travel going to and returning from Court.” Substantially the same provisions, in so far as the language fixes the amount of mileage, were embodied in previous laws (Rev. Code, ch. 28, sec. 15; Rev. Stats., ch. 28, sec. 21), and had been construed uniformly to allow compensation for the distance traveled by the usual route from a juror’s home to reach the courthouse on the first day of the term, and for the same distance in returning at the end of the term. Each Commissioner, ■according to the statute (The Gode, § 709), is to “receive for his services and expenses in attending the meetings of the Board not exceeding two dollars per day, as a majority of the Board may fix upon, and they may be allowed mileage to and from their respective places of meeting, not to exceed five cents per mile.” Section 706 was evidently drawn with *655the purpose of limiting the length of the sessions of the Board, so that at the special meetings held on the first Monday of months other than June and December, they shall not continue in session longer than two days, and of incidentally restricting the right of the Board to incur expense. There is a similarity of expression in the statutes regulating the compensation of jurors and Commissioners that naturally leads to the conclusion that it was the purpose of the Legislature to limit the allowance for mileage to the distance traveled by the usual.route to reach the place of meeting on the first Monday of each month and the same distance added when the monthly meeting should end, whether on the evening of the first day or after the lapse of two or more days.
It remains to determine whether in auditing accounts for and receiving a greater amount of mileage than was due to them, the individual members of the Board have made themselves amenable to this criminal prosecution. The verdict and admissions would fall short of establishing the guilt of the defendants, if the indictment were admitted to be so drawn as to charge with sufficient certainty either or both of the offences created by section 1090 of The Code. The proof fails to sustain the charge of wilful neglect or omission to discharge a duty, since its sole tendency is to show the commission of an offence consisting in the act of causing or directing an order to be issued to the County Treasurer to pay a greater sum as per diem and mileage than was due. State v. Snuggs, 85 N. C., 541; State v. Hawkins, 77 N. C., 494.
It is equally insufficient to justify a verdict of guilty under the last clause of that section, since it is found as a fact that the defendants did not take the money received by them as mileage “with any corrupt or fraudulent motive,” whereas it is essential, in order to sustain that charge, “ to aver in the indictment and prove upon the trial a corrupt intent.” State v. Pritchard, 107 N. C., 921.
*656The essence of the offence created by section 711 of The Code is the "neglect to perform any duty required by law,”' and an indictment drawn-under it caunot be sustained by' proof of the act of wilfully taking a greater sum as mileage than was due. To support the charge of the common law offence of taking illegal fees, it is also necessary to prove “ a corrupt motive” (2 Wharton Or. Law,7th ed., sec. 2521), while the evidence falls as far short of proving the common law offence of neglecting to discharge a duty enjoined by law, as it does of showing neglect, as distinguished from overt acts in violation of the provisions of sections 711 and 1020, supra.
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that while the defendants were not entitled to the mileage charged, there was error, nevertheless, in declaring them guilty upon the return of the special verdict, and a new trial must therefore be granted. New Trial.