after stating the case: It is to be noticed that the defendant’s policy referred to and embraced particular goods of particular kinds or classes It was not intended by it to insure the plaintiff’s whole stock of goods, but to insure those particularly described and specified. The policy of the Orient Fire Insurance Company was plainly intended to be comprehensive — it specifies the plaintiff’s “ wholesale stock of drugs, paints, oils, dye-stuffs and other goods.” These last are comprehensive words — not limited to other wholesale goods “on hand for sale not more hazardous,” simply in the wholesale part of the house, but “contained in three-story brick and basement metal-roof building.” There is no word of limitation except the -word “ wholesale,” and it is supplemented and the meaning and purpose enlarged and extended to “other goods on hand for sale,” not simply of the wholesale stock, but other goods — goods other than those specified by name “contained in the three-story brick and basement *353metul-ioof building.” Moreover, in the nature of the matter, why, in the face of such comprehensive terms, should the meaning of the purpose to insure be limited to the wholesale stock of goods? Why should the plaintiff, in the absence of the limited purpose sptcified, be deemed to have intended to insure one part of its goods and not another? Besides, the care and caution of insurers, always observed by them, to limit their liability in plain and express terms, forbid the interpretation contended for by the plaintiff. In addition, in case of doubtful meaning their policies are to be taken most strongly against them. They execute them, and are presumed to be on their guard and observe due caution in expressing and defining their liability.
Affirmed.